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To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike / 
Re: attached pool memo No. 85-1092 V 
Date: March 6, 1986 
• 
The memo-writer recommends DENY on Question Presented 
#2, and l agree. On Question Presented #1 [the "takings" 
question], she feels that the fact that the federal government is 
revising its regulations regarding subsidence effects justifies 
calling for the views of the SG, even though she is otherwise 
inclined to recommend DENY. l see no need to CVSG, and l 
""'-
recommend DENY. lf new regulations are issued that alleviate to 
some degree coal companies' duties to surface land owners, the 
state does not have to follow suit. The state's regulations only 
have to be as restrictive as the federal regulations; nothing 
- -···-·-·-
prevents them from being stricter, and Pennsylvania may well 
choose to leave its existing regulations in place. In an~ event, 
new regulations that lessen the effect of any alleged taking 
would only weaken petr's case . 
,. 
' 
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Cert to CA3 (Adams, Weis, Wisdom 
[CAS] ) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs mount a facial challenge to state stat-
utes and regulations that restrict the amount of coal that can be 
mined. They allege a taking of their property in violation of 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and infringe-
[_ ou-er 
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ment o f their rights protected by the Contract Clause. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDI NGS BELOW: Owne r s and operators o f 
bituminous coal mines brought suit pursuant to 42 u.s.c. §1983 
challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Pa. 
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. §1406.1, and its implementing regulations promulgated 
by the state Department of Environmental Resources (DER). Named 
as defendants were the DER officials responsible for administering 
the Act. 
A substantial amount of the coal reserves in the mines lies 
beneath buildings and other features located on land whose surface 
is owned by others. Coal mining results in subsidence--the lower-
ing of the strata overlying a coal mine because of underground 
coal extraction. During 1890-1920, when petrs predominantly pur-
chased the rights to mine and remove the coal, they regularly 
secured waivers of the surface owners' rights to collect damage s 
for harm to the surface or surface structures caused by subsi-
dence. 
Although the Subsidence Act was passed in 1966, it was later 
amended partly as a response to the federal Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1979, 39 u.s.c. §§1201 et seq. The federal 
act provides that a state may assume primary control over mine 
reclamation activities within its borders by adopting a regulatory 
scheme at least as stringent as the federal law. Pa.' s program 
was approved under this scheme. See 30 C.F.R. §§938.1-.20 (1983). 
The purposes of the law were to preserve land in Pa., thus 
promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the people of Pa., 
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and to preserve a tax base for certain municipalities in order to 
enhance Pa.'s economic welfare. 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.3. 
The DC (WD Pa., Ziegler, J.) denied petrs' motion for summary 
judgment and granted the DER partial summary judgment and dis-
missed the complaint. As a consequence of post-trial motions the 
matter was reopened and upon joint request of the parties, the DC 
certified several issues for appeal and stayed further proceedings 
in the DC. CA3 accepted jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1292(b), and affirmed, holding that Pa. had not violated any 
constitutional rights. 
A. Taking 
Petrs had challenged as a taking in violation of Mahon sec-
tions 4 of the Act, §1406. 4; certain regulations implementing 
sections 4 and 5(e) of the Act, §§89.145, 89.146(b) (1). Section 4 
and DER regulation §89.145 prohibit mine operators from mining 
"bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-
in, collapse or subsidence" when there is in the proximity of a 
mine a public building or any noncommercial structure; any dwell-
ing used for human habitation; and other features listed. 
Section 5(e) of the Act requires that, in order to prevent 
subsidence causing 
technologically and 
material damage, mine 
economically feasible 
operators must adopt 
measures to maximize 
mine stability and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable 
uses of surface land. Regulation §89.146(b) (1) specifies that 
coal operators shall provide a support area in which the amount of 
extraction is limited to 50% of their coal, unless the operators 
can prove to the DER that less support will not result in any 
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subsidence damage. See petn for cert. 4; 25 Pa. Code §89.146. 
CA3 distinguished Mahon. In Mahon, the plaintiffs (owner o f 
the surface on which their house was located), relying on a state 
law known as the Kohler Act, sought to enjoin the mining by de-
fendant coal company, to the extent that the mining would damage 
their home. The company had secured the right to remove the coal 
as well as a waiver of all claims from subsidence damage. 260 
U.S., at 412. The Kohler Act, passed by the state legislature in 
1921, forbade the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to 
cause the subsidence of certain classes of buildings. 
CA3 found that the gravamen of the company's complaint in 
Mahon was that the Kohler Act merely protected the rights of a 
small group of private parties at the expense of other private 
parties, and was not legislation intended to promote a broad pub-
lic interest pursuant to the police power. 260 U.S., at 394-404. 
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, agreed with the compa-
ny's characterization of the Act's purpose. He noted, 
the case of a single private house ..•• The damage is 
"This i;i 
not comm~ 
or public." Id., at 413. Furthermore, "the extent of the public 
interest [was] shown by the statute to be limited" since the Koh-
ler Act did not "apply to land when the surface [was] owned by the 
owner of the coal." Id., at 414. 
The Court in Mahon found that if the Act was designed to 
protect personal safety, it was overbroad because the State could 
have simply given notice to homeowners of intended mining activi-
ties. The Court thus distinguished Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), in which it had upheld legislation 
• 
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requiring coal pillars to be left in the ground on the basis that 
those requirements were necessary "for the safety of employees." 
260 U.S., at 415. 
Not only was the Kohler Act found to lack substantial police 
power justifications, but it apparently rendered the removal of 
coal "commercially impracticable." Id., at 414. With so little 
justification, the state law was a taking. 
In contrast, the Subsidence Act seeks to prevent common or 
public damage. The legislature found that damage from mine subsi-
dence had seriously impeded land development throughout Pa. and 
eroded the tax base of numerous municipalities. 52 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. §1406.3. Moreover, no surface owner was excluded from 
coverage, buttressing the truly public purpose of preserving sur-
face estates. The legislature here found that notice had not 
sufficed to promote the varied public concerns at issue, and petrs 
offered no evidence to show that this legislative determination 
was erroneous. Thus, Mahon does not control this case. 
The inquiry into whether a governmental action has taken 
private property without just compensation turns on the peculiar 
facts of each case. The Court has upheld regulation, pursuant to 
a State's police powers, that destroyed or adversely affected 
property interests, but when the regulation reaches a certain 
magnitude, there may be a taking requiring compensation. Id., at 
125, 127. Here, there was no taking. 
A "taking may more readily be found when the interference 
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by gov-
ernment •..• than when interference arises from some public program 
• 
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adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the l f 
common good." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Ci ty , 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The State regulates, rather than physi-
cally invades, petrs' property. Since the State's requirements 
have adjusted the benefits and burdens of economic life to protect 
the public, its action is less likely to be a taking. 
The degree of interference with the property has been meas-
ured by the diminution of value and the extent to which the regu-
lation interfe r es with reasonable, distinct, investment-backed 
expectations. The denial of one traditional property right does 
not always amount to a taking where alteinative beneficial uses of 
the property remain. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
Here, the question of the degree of interference is compli-
cated by the fact that the property is divided into multiple es-
tates under state law: surf ace, support, and miner al estates. 
The support estate consists of the right either to remove the 
strata of coal and what undergirds the surface or to leave those 
layers intact to support the surface and prevent subsidence. 
Thus, although Pa. law recognizes the support estate as a separate 
property interest, it cannot be used profitably by one who does 
not also possess either the mineral estate or the surface estate. 
The support estate is more properly viewed as only one "strand" in 
the petrs' "bundle" of property rights, which also includes the 
mineral estate. CA3 stated the property rights must be viewed in 
the aggregate and that the destruction of one strand is not a 
taking. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S., at 65. Though petrs may be 
precluded from the most profitable use of their property, they are 
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not prevented from all profitable uses. Compare Mahon. 
The State did not overly interfere with investment-backed 
expectations. A property owner's reasonable expectations as to 
the possible uses of his property are always circumscribed by the 
limitations on its use that may be imposed by the State in the 
public interest. Thus, CA3 found there was no taking. 
B. Contract Clause 
Section 6 of the Act provides that if "the removal of coal or 
other mining operations causes damage to structures set forth in 
section 4" the operator must "submit evidence that such damage has 
been repaired or that all claims arising therefrom have been sat-
isfied •... " 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.6. This duty is appar-
ently imposed even though a mine operator has left coal in place 
beneath that structure or holds a release or waiver of damage from 
the surface owner. 
CA3 rejected petrs' Contract Clause claim, using a three-step 
inquiry. First, the state law has substantially impaired the 
contractual relationship, and second, there is a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation. Third, CA3 held 
that the court should defer to the legislative judgment as to the 
reasonableness of the particular measure, as is customary in re-
viewing economic and social regulations in other contexts. See 
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977). 
Since the legislature's determination was reasonable, it should be 
upheld. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend that every mine they operate 
is beneath at least one protected structure. In order to comply 
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with the Pa. scheme, they will have to leave approx. 30 million 
tons of coal in their mines. It is undisputed that no one can 
prove what amount of underground support will ensure against sub-
sidence of the surface, so the effect of the regulation has been 
and will be that at least 50% of the support coal must remain 
unmined. Petrs' costs accordingly have been increased because 
that percentage precludes use of their cheapest method of mining. 
On the takings issue, CA3 has greatly expanded the state's 
power vis-a-vis individuals and its decision conflicts with the 
result in Mahon. In addition, Mahon contends that a court should 
look at the impact of the state's regulation on the individual; 
but CA3 balanced the state's interest in its regulation and the 
individual's property right. CA3 also undervalued petrs' property 
rights. It ignored Pa.'s determination of a support estate as 3 
separate estate, and it underestimated petrs' investment-backed 
expectations by balancing them against the strength of the State's 
interest. 
Petrs add that the US Dep't of Interior is currently recon-
sidering its regulations governing the subsidence effects of un-
dergound coal mining which will almost certainly be affected by 
CA3's interpretation of Mahon. See petn for cert 11 n. 11. They 
add the case need not be held for MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
County of Yolo, No.; 84-2015, which raises the issues of whether 
zoning regulations can be so oppressive as to constitute a taking 
and whether such a taking must be compensated under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
On the Contract Clause issue, petrs contend CA3 used a too 
' 
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deferential standard. When a State severely impairs a contract 
between private parties, the proper Contract Clause standard of 
review is the "reasonable and necessary" test developed in Horne 
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) and reaf-
firmed in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 
(1978). CA3 applied a test properly applicable only to minimal 
impairments. Thus, CA3's Contract Clause analysis conflicts with 
decisions of this Court and those of CAs that have followed them. 
Resps contend that statistics compiled by the DER during this 
litigation show that less than 2% of subsurface earth has been 
left to support the surface in 10 of the 13 mines in issue. The 
information provided by the coal companies revealed that from 1966 
through 1982, they paid approx. $186,000 in damages pursuant to 
section 6 of the Act. During that time, all coal companies in the 
State paid claims totalling $2.3 million, or an average of $6,255 
for each of 375 damaged structures, according to DER's records. 
In the absence of evidence of economic impact on particular 
parcels of land, a regulatory statute effects a taking only if it 
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Petrs do not state that their 
mines are no longer economically viable. They instead isolate 
their ownership in the support estate and argue that property 
right is abolished. The record in this case is insufficient to 
permit this Court to determine whether the support requirements 
have a sufficient impact on petrs' property to amount to a taking. 
On the Contract Clause issue, CA3 applied the correct test, 
and simply because it analogized to economic legislation does not 
• 
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mean that it was applying a Due Process test. Circumstances in 
Pa. have changed in unforeseen ways since the late 1800s. There 
is now a scarcity of land for development and pressure on munici-
pal tax bases. There is no conflict. There is no need to clarify 
the proper standard. 
Petrs' reply on the Contract Clause issue contends that cert 
should be granted to clarify that this Court's decision in Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400 (1983) did not reject or modify the "reasonable and necessary" 
test. 
The amici emphasize how important this case is to coal compa-
nies. 
4. DISCUSSION: On the takings issue, the case is very close 
to Mahon, but I think CA3's distinction can stand up well enough 
so that the Court is not required to grant this case on that basis 
alone. I do not read Mahon as prohibiting all subsidence regula-
tion. Thus, the question here is one of degree. CA3 was correct 
that this Court has looked at the total property right and not 
simply a single impaired interest. Id., at 130; Andrus, 444 U.S., 
at 66. The amount of harm to these coal companies is hard to 
determine given the possibility for administrative variances from 
the 50% requirement. Also, we do not know how much these petrs 
were harmed or whether they have been denied variances. It does 
appear, however, that their mining operations can still be profit-
able, though less so. But in the zoning area, the Court has up-
held regulations that reduced the value of the property by 75% and 
87 1/2%. See cases cited in Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 131. See 
' . - -- 11 -
also id., at 129. 
Petrs overstate their case by saying that the Court never 
before balanced the state and private interests in a takings anal-
ysis. Such a balancing was done, although implicitly. Mahon 
itself acknowledges this. 260 U.S., at 415. See also Andrus v. 
Allara, 444 U.S., at 65 ("government regulation--by definition--
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good"). In Penn 
Cent r a 1 , 4 3 8 u . s . , at 13 0-131 , the Court s a i a : "In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses ••. both on the character of the action and on 
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the par-
cel as a whole •.•• " Thus, I think the balancing part of petrs' 
contentions is not a certworthy issue. 
Turning to the Contract Clause issue, the Court has said that 
the level of scrutiny varies with the severity of the state law's 
impairment of the contractual relationship. Energy Reserves 
Group, 459 U.S., at 411. It is conceded here that there was a 
substantial impairment and that the State had a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation. Petn for cert 
19a. Once these factors are present: 
the next inquiry is whether the adjustment of "the 
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is 
based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a charac-
ter appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the 
legislation's] adoption." •.. Unless the State itself 
is a contracting party ... "fa]s is customary in review-
ing economic and social regulation, ••• courts properly 
defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of a particular measure." 
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S., at 412-413 (citations omitted). 
Although CA3 did not quote the standard precisely, it was close. 
• 
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CA3 stated that courts should "defer to the legislative judgment 
as to the reasonableness of the particular measure, as is custom-
ary in reviewing economic and social regulations in other con-
texts." Petn for cert 19a. Petrs point out that in Nat'l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1455 
n. 25 (1985), the Court stated that the principles of economic 
regulation under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause are not 
necessarily coextensive with the Contract Clause. However, since 
CA3 did not rely on such a distinction, and since the standard it 
r 
applied was within reasonable proximity to this Court's str ic-
tures, I think it is unnecessary to review its holding as to the 
Contract Clause. Petrs provide no compelling reasons to review 
Energy Reserves, which attempted to harmonize the case they rely 
on, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), 
with the one CA3 relied on, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 
431 U.S. 1 (1977). See 459 U.S., at 410-413. 
Petrs contend that the federal government is currently work-
ing on its regulations regarding subsidence effects. In addition, 
Pa.'s program was approved by the federal government. Because of 
these facts and because the taking issue is not clear-cut, I rec-
ommend calling for the views of the solicitor general on the first 
issue only. I would recommend denial on the second issue. 
I agree with petrs that the case should not be held for Mac-
Donald. Takings cases are very factually based, and I think the 
factual differences in the two cases will require distinct ana-
lyses. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend calling for the views of the 
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solicitor general on question 1. 
There is a response, a reply, and two amicus briefs. 




lfp/ss 08/27/86 KEYSTONE SALLY-POW 
85-1092 Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis (CA3) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is a difficult case that presents important 
questions under the "taking" and "contract" clauses of the 
Constitution. As I will want a bench memo from my clerk, 
I will ao little more than identify the issues. The 
opinions below, both by the DC ana CA3, are well written 
and sustain the validity of the Pennsylvania Bituminous 
Mine Subsidence ana Lana Conservation Act {the Act), ana 
regulations thereunder. The validity of the Act and 
regulations adopted under the Act, also were sustained. 
The case was aeciaea on cross-summary j uagment mot ions, 
and therefore there has been no trial on a specific 
factual situation. 
The provisions of the Act are detailed. They can 
best be understood in light of the provisions of 
Pennsylvania law with respect to the mining of coal. 
Under Pennsylvania property law there may be three 
separate and distinct estates in land: (i) the surface, 
(ii) the coal beneath the surface, and {iii) what is 
called the "support estate". Each of these interests may, 
at a particular time, be owned by different persons. The 
- - 2. 
extraction of underground coal leads to the subsidence of 
the earth overlying the coal. Accordingly, it has been 
customary in Pennsylvania for many years for coal mining 
companies, or the owners of coal mining property, to 
acquire the "support estate" as means of limiting or 
preventing liability to the surface owner when coal is 
removed. 
The record in this case apparently shows that 
also it was customary for petitioners or their 
predecessors in interest (coal companies) to acquire both 
the coal and the right to mine all of the coal 
notwithstanding any resulting surface subsidence. It was 
customary for the purchaser of coal to obtain a release 
from liability for injury to the surface estate resulting 
from subsidence. On p. 4 of petitioner's brief, the 
language in such contracts is set forth. It explicitly 
reserves the right to mine and remove the coal "without 
being required to provide or leave support for the 
overlying strata or surface, and without being liable for 
any injury to the overlying land or to structures thereon 
"(Br., p. 4). 
The Pennsylvania Act (adopted in 1 
• 
• 
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Act, including the need to protect the public health, 
safety and welfare; to preserve surface land; and to 
enhance the state's tax base. The Act prohibits mining 
that causes subsidence damage to certain specified 
structures, and regulations under the Act "require coal 
operators to leave 50% of their coal in place for support 
under structures and features protected" unless the mine 
operators prove that leaving less support coal will not 
result in any subsidence damage. 
Neither the Act nor the regulations make any 
provision for compensation for the "taking" of the 
operators' coal that - under the statute - must be left to 
support the surface. Nor does the Act provide for damages 
for the abrogation of these private contracts. 
The primary question, as I view it, is whether 
there is a violation of the taking clause. Petitioners' 
excellent brief (Rex Lee, Ben Heineman - who clerked for 
Potter Stewart - and Sidley & Austin) relies heavily - as 
would be expected - on Justice Holmes' opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. The 
Pennsylvania statute at issue in that case (the Kohler 
Act) contains - in major part substantially identical 
language as in the Bituminous Coal Act now before us . 
• 
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Both of these statutes abolish the "support estate" that 
is conceded to be a distinct property right defined by 
Pennsylvania state law. Petitioners also rely on Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, and petitioners make 
a rather persuasive argument that Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, was 
quite a different case from Mahon. 
Petitioners' brief also is persuasive in arguing 
that the courts below applied the wrong standard of 
Contract Clause review, and mistakenly held that there was 
no impairment of the obligation of contract • The courts 
below, and particularly the DC, relied on the three-step 
analysis of a Contract Clause issue adopted in Energy 
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400. 
Both courts below conceded, however, that §6 of the Act, 
now before us, "does operate as a substantial impairment 
of contractual relationships". But the DC and CA3 then go 
on to hold that the Act's effect on contractual 
relationships "serves a legitimate public purpose". This 
purpose was found to be the "devastating effect" of this 
type of contract upon the "health, safety and economic 
welfare of the commonwealth and its people." 
* * * 
• 
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As noted above, this case not only is difficult 
in view of our decisions both with respect to the Taking 
and Contract Clauses. One also can well understand that 
where surface land subsides or sinks as a result of the 
removal of coal beneath, the effect on public and private 
surface property can be serious. Also the state's "tax 
base" can be adversely affected depending on the extent of 
damage to surface land statewide. My guess is that this 
is not great. Also, the state certainly derives tax 
benefits from the owning and mining of coals. What the 
courts below may have overlooked is that when private 
property is taken even for the most necessary public 
purposes, the Constitution provides for compensation. 
This is made clear by Justice Holmes in Mahon, and is 
clear from the Fifth Amendment itself. 
The question for me, therefore, is whether the 
"taking" here results in a substantial or significant 
deprivation of private property. Apparently up to 50% of 
the coal purchased and paid for by mining companies may be 
"taken" under the current Pennsylvania statute without 
compensation. It is not easy to conclude that this is 
insubstantial, or that there is not a direct taking or 
confiscation of private property. 
• 
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The Penn Central case, heavily relied on by the 
state, does lend some support to its argument. I have not 
reread that decision - that I joined. My recollection is 
that Penn Central had used the land for the purpose for 
which it was acquired; there was no taking of any part of 
that use, and indeed no taking of any part of the surface 
or the buildings thereon. There was merely a limiting of 
the ownership of air space above - a type of limiting that 
has become necessary and is frequently found in zoning 
ordinances everywhere. 
With respect to the Contract Clause issue, I 
would agree that our cases have substantially diluted the 
right to rely on this clause. Yet I do not recall any 
prior case that would annul, by legislative action, an 
explicit contract entered into by private parties - a type 
of contract deemed valid and enforceable for decades under 
Pennsylvania state law. 
made in light of, and 
law. 
Presumably these contracts were 
reliance on, settled Pennsylvania 
In sum, I confess to being more than a little 
shocked by the decisions below. The state interest is 
legitimate and arguably is substantial, al though we have 
no facts in the record before us in this respect. In 
• 
• 
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thinking of other "takings" of private property when 
compensation is paid without question, the following come 
to mind: the building of great dams (e.g., Hoover Dam), 
interstate highways, public buildings, and utility 
easements. In all of these cases the state inter est -
indeed often the publ i c interest in health and safety -is 
both legitimate and substant i al. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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No. 85-1092, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus 
Cert. to CA3 (Adams, Weis, Wisdom) 
Monday, November 10, 1986 (second argument) 
I 
Two questions are presented in this case. First, does a 
Pennsylvania statute which requires coal mine operators to leave 
a certain amount of coal in the ground as support violate the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Second, does the statute 
violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution? 
II 
~ are~ wners of coal properties an~ perators of un-
derground bituminous coal mines in Western Pennsylvania, and an 
- -
- - page 2. 
• association of coal mining companies. Petrs brought suit under 
42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that several provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Sub-
sidence Act), 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.1 et ~-, and its 
implementing regulations promulgated by the state Department of 
• 
✓ 
Environmental Resources (DER) are unconstitutional. The DC orig-
inally denied petr's motion for summary judgment, granted the DER 
partial summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint. On post-
.../ 
\,../"-
t ~ s, the DC reopened the case, certified several gues- ? 
tions for appeal, and stayed further proceedings in the DC. The 
~ -
CA3 ~ <l the challenge to the statute and regulations on /- 1 J-c 
- 5 w~ 
their face. Al though petrs also challenged the statute 
plied, this question has not yet been resolved by the DC. 
as ap- v1--
~of rr 
Subsidence is the lowering of the strata overlying a coal 
mine because of undergroun ____ ___ _ Pennsylvania law divides 
property into three estates -- the surface estate, the support 
estate, and the mineral estate. Predominantly during the period 
1890-1920, petrs purchased from land owners the right to mine the 
coal beneath their land. Regularly included in the deeds were 
waivers of the surface estate owner's right to collect damages ---------,. 








The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Subsidence Act 
vf ~J...1-ie 
Its purposes are to preserve the land and the tax base d-~. 
of the State. 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.3. of the 
Subsidence Act, 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.4, prohibits mine 
j t/- ,t,,, 
S' f4,k.,'<_ 
• operators from mining "bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a 




- - page 3 . 
structures." e ~ ion 5 c_v) of the Act requires that, in order to S S-________ ,., 
prevent subsidence, mine operators must take measures to maximize 
mine stability and maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable 
uses of the surface land. Accompanying regulations specify that, 4-<f .S 
at a minimum, the measures adopted must be that: 
(1) For each structure or feature to be protected, 
the operator shall E.E_9vide a suEport area in which the 
amount of extraction is limited to 50%, leaving for 
support pillars of coal of a size and in a pattern 
which maximize bearing strength and are approved by 
the Department. No mining is permitted beneath a 




2 5 Pa. Adm in. Code § 8 9 • 14 6 ( b) ( 1) • 
0:ec t i~ f the Act provides that if "the removal of 
coal or other mining operations ... causes damage to structures 
set forth in section 4" the operator must "submit evidence that 
such damage has been repaired or that all claims arising there-
from have been satisfied." 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1406.6. 
Section 89.147(b) of the DER regulations provide: 
When underground coal mining activities reduce the val-
ue or the reasonably foreseeable uses of surface land, 
the operator shall restore the land to the extent tech-
nologically and economically feasible to its premining 
condition. 
Petrs argue that the support requirements of the Subsi-
dence Act violate the Takings Clause of the Constitution, because 
they "take" a substantial portion of petrs' rights in the support 
estate. Sepcifically, petrs claim that since the Act's enactment 
they have been forced to leave over 30 million tons of coal in 
the ground and will be forced to ab
0
andon more in the future, 
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J .A. at 36-37; 41-43. Petrs also allege that the Act will in 
some circumstances make their preferrred method of mining, the 
longwall method, commercially impractical. 
The CA3 first found Pennsylvania v. @ 260 U.S. 393 ,<A- 3 
· · · 1 b t t' 11 .. ~/..,._~ (1922), which held unconst1tut1ona a statute su s an 1a y s1m1-
lar to the Subsidence Act, to be distinguishable. Although the 
language of the two statutes is virtually identical, the CA3 
found that unlike the Kohler Act, at issue in Mahon, the Subsi-
dence Act serves a public purpose and does not render the removal 
of coal commercially impractical. Because Mahon was distinguish-
~w 
able, the CA3 proceeded to apply the three-part test articulated ~ 
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
(1978). It found no physical invasion of 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 ~t-.-.t._ 
"'3 -11_,_,/-
petrs' property. As to ~f--
the degree of interference, the CA3 found that the support estate 
is just one "strand" in the "bundle" of property rights held by C/1 3 's 
~~etrs. Thus, their entire bundle of property rights has not been 
~ destroyed. Finally, the CA3 found no significant interference 
I I 
·h,J~ , ·· 
0 ~----1 r 
t 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations because the Subsi- ~ 
~f-
a.ence Act serves a public purpose, and petrs could not reasonably )~-, 
w,..(..~r-' 
have expected to profit at public expense. .4-e e •-If,/-• ~ 
P 1 h h d 
. . ~4.-~ 
etrs a so argue t at t e amage payment prov1s1ons v1O- ~4:~-df'.,C,-, 
~~ 
late the Contract Clause of the Cons ti tut ion because they nullify  ~q_ 
the explicit damage waiver provisions in petrs' contracts. The ~ 
CA3 found that unless the State is itself a party to the con-
tract, a reviewing court should defer to the legislative judgment 1~~ 
<"'4. ~~--.1 
as to the reasonableness of a particular measure. The CA3 then~~ 
determined that although section 6 operates as a substantial im- ~g,:_ 
,, ... R..,1'--
/2.-~) 
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• pairment of contractual relationships, the state has shown that 
the regulation serves a legitimate public purpose. The CA3 found 
the DER regulation to be a reasonable condition of a character 
appropriate to the public purposes. 
• 
III 
A. Pennsylvania v. Mahon is Not Easily Distinguished 
The primary question to be resolved in this case is the 
relationship of this case and Pennsylvania v. Mahon, written by 
Justice Holmes in 1922. The facts of Mahon are very similar to 
those presented in this case. In Mahon, private homeowners 
brought suit to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining 
under their property so as to remove the supports and cause sub-
sidence of the surface and of their house. The homeowners' deed 
conveyed the surface estate to them, but expressly reserved the 
right to remove all coal under the surface, with the homeowners 
assuming all risk of damage to the premises. The homeowners re-
lied on the Kohler Act, as Pennsylvania statute enacted after the 
effective date of the deed. The Kohler Act prohibited mining of 
coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of various structures, 
including a private house. 
According to the Court in Mahon, "The question is whether 
the police power can be stretched so far." 260 U.S. at 413. The 
Court first noted that "[t]his is the case of a single private 
house" and that damage to such a structure "is not public or com-
mon." Ibid. Balancing the public interest against the extent of 
~ --- - -
the taking, the Court concluded that "the statute does not dis-
close a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a de-
~ 
• 
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struction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." -Id. at 414. The Court then addressed the validity of the Act in ~' 
general. The Court assumed that the Act made it commercially 
impractical to mine certain coal. As such, it found that the Act 
could not be sustained. The Court stated, "We are in danger of 
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. 
at 416. The Court concluded, "So far as private persons or com-
munities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface 
rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a 
danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they 
bought." Ibid. 
It is not easy to distinguish Mahon from the present 
case. The effect of the two statutes on coal mining companies is 
the same. The CA3 found that there is no showing in the present 
case that the statute makes it commercially impractical to mine 
certain coal. But, the Court in Mahon assumed commercial imprac-
ticability. Thus, it is unclear why this Court should not do the 
same under the same fact situation. Moreover, the statute here 
clearly prohibits mining certain coal which is contained in the --------------------------
support estate. Thus, there is no question that the mining of at 
least some coal is commercially impractical. 
The CA3's primary distinction between the two statutes --
that the Subsidence Act was enacted to serve a public purpose 
~ 
• whereas the Kohler Act addressed only private concerns -- is very 9f w. 
weak. - It is true that private homeowners brought suit in Mahon. tv<d-
• 
• 
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But, they nevertheless relied on a statute enacted by the state. 
State statutes presumptively serve a public purpose. More impor-
tantly, the Court in Mahon went on to find the statute invalid 
even as addressed to properties committed to public use. Admit-
tedly, there is some distinction between protection by the state 
of its property, a subject of eminent domain, and an attempt by 
the state to further public goals not related directly to its own 
property. This distinction weakens, however, when the coverage 
of the Kohler Act and the Subsidence Act are compared. Both cov-
er public and private properties. Although there is explicit 
statutory language to support the purposes of the Subsidence Act, 
it is difficult to assume that the Kohler Act was not addressed 
to similar public purposes. Distinguishing the two statutes on 
public purpose grounds would also contradict this Court's state-
ment in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
U.S. 104, 127 (1978) that Mahon "is the leading case for 
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers 
438 ~ -the G..-....~ 
i ~ 
portant public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-
backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.'" 
B. The Facial Challenge is Premature -
Although the easiest result in this case would be to fol-
low Mahon, this would ignore developments in taking law since 
1922. The first problem with applying Mahon to this case is that \ 
to the extent the Mahon accepts a facial challenge to a land-use 
statute without proof of actual harm, it has already been implic-
i tly over ruled. The Court has recently stated that "[a] court 
cannot determine whether a regulation 'goes too far' unless it 
• 
• 
- - page 
,,.,,. 
knows how far the regulation goes." ~ acDonald, Sommer & Fr 
v. Yolo County, 106 s. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986), thus implicitly 
contradicting Mahon itself. In~ del v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Court 
upheld the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977 as constitutional on its face. The DC had assumed that cer-
tain provisions of the Act deprived mine owners "of any use of 
[their] land, not only the most profitable," and thus violated 
Mahon. This Court found that that conclusion suffered from the 
fatal deficiency that no party had identified the specific land 
which had allegedly been taken. Thus, the only issue before the 
DC was whether the "mere enactment" of the Act constituted a tak-
ing. The test to be applied to a facial challenge to a statute 
is whether the statute "denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land." 452 U.S. at 296 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The Act survived this scrutiny. It did 
not on its face prevent beneficial use of the land and the paten-
, 
tial that owners may receive administrative variances from spe-
cific applications precluded challenge to the likely effect of 
)~ -
~;-fz,>/4L 
certain provisions. You concurred, noting that although chal-~ 
lenge at that point was premature, the Act as applied might well 
constitute a taking. 
Hodel is but one in a series of cases finding ~ ial 
challenges to land-use statutes to be premature. MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates; Williamson Company Regional Planning v. Hamil-
ton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. 
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similarly premature. On its face, the Subsidence Act only pro-
hibits the mining of 50% of the coal under structures covered by 
the Act. Because many surface areas do not contain such struc-
~f-
 
tures, the actual amount of coal in the support estate which must ~
c__.-- ------------------------ < /2.;~~ 
be left in place is lower than 50%. There is n~~~e on the ~ 
---------------------------- ~., ~__i., 
record that the 50% requirement denies mine owners economically I/~-~·· 
1 
viable use of the support estate or of their property as a whole. 
Consequently, on a f~cial challenge, which is all that is appro-
priate in this case, the Subsidence Act survives scrutiny under 
the Takings Clause. 
C. The Diminution in Value Does Not Constitute a Taking 
This case is presented in a slightly different posture 
than other cases which the Court has found to be premature. 
Here, the Act has been in ef feet for twenty years. Thus, the 2 6 ~ 
record contains some indication of its effect on petrs. Also, a 
primary issue in this case is the continuing vitality of Mahon. 
In Mahon, the Court a_ssumed the damage alleged by petrs and found 
--------
the statute at issue unconstitutional. Because of the similarity 
between Mahon and this case, the Court may want to make clear 
that under the Takings Clause as it has been interpretted since 
Mahon, even petrs' allegations if assumed true do not amount to a 
taking. A review of several recent cases establishes that the 
Court has found economic impacts far more severe than that al-
leged here not to constitute a taking. 
~ 
In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the Court 
upheld a local ordinance which prohibited gravel mining below the 
water table and required the affected gravel company to refill 
?? 
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• any areas already below the water table. The Court conceded that 
the ordinance "completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the 
property has previously been devoted." 369 U.S. at 592. The 
Court found no evidence that the prohibition of mining would re-
duce the value of the lot in question, and upheld the regulation 
as a valid exercise of the town's police power . 
• 
In Usery v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the ~ 
Court upheld a statute requiring coal mine operators to compen-
sate former employees disabled by pneumoniosis, even though the 
operators never contracted for such liability, and the employers 
involved had long since terminated their contact with the indus-
try. The Court stated that "our cases are clear that legislation 
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it 
upsets otherwise settled expectations. . . . This is true even 
though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or 
liability based on past acts." 428 U.S. at 15-16. 
In Penn Central, the Court upheld the landmark designa-
tion of Grand Central Station, even though it prohibited Penn 
Central from using its air rights to build a profitable high rise 
structure. According to the Court, "[T]he submission that appel-
lants may establish a "taking" simply by showing that they have 
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they 
heretofore had believed was available for development is simply 
untenable." 438 U.S. at 130. The Court found that "' [tlaking' 
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated." 438 U.S. at 130. Instead 
• 
• 
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the focus is on the "parcel as a whole." Id. at 130-131. Deci-
sions sustaining other land-use regulations which are reasonably 
related to a promotion of the general welfare uniformly reject 
the proposition that diminution in property value, standing 
alone, can establish a "taking." See Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zon-
ing law); Hadecheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87 1/2% 
diminution in value -- from $800,000 to $60,000). The Court also 
found that the regulation permitted the primary use of the termi-
nal and allowed the owners a reasonable return on their invest-
ment, and that the transferability of the air rights to other 
structures in the city gave them some value . 
In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court upheld 
a federal law prohibiting the owners of eagle artifacts from 
selling them. The fact that the owners were deprived of the most 
profitable use of their property was not dispositive. It was 
significant that there is no physical invasion or restraint upon 
the property. According to the Court, the denial of one tradi- 8wf 
At H-t_ tional property right does not always amount to a taking. 
~ 
least where the owner possesses a full "bundle" of property  
rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a ~~ 
~<..:-v 
"eu-.f!._,. 
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. 
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 106 S. _ "2-<.U r 
Ct. 1018 (1986), the Court upheld an ERISA amendment imposing rtL-t__ 
-~-
withdrawal liability on employers, even though the employers were  
..,.4,< .. .-l_ 
protected by contract from liability assessments beyond those ~ . 
specifically enumerated. The Court found that "the fact that 
- - page 12. 
• legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights 
does not always transform the regulation into an illegal taking." 
106 s. Ct. at 1025. Applying the factors enumerated in Penn Cen-
tral, the Court first found, "This interference with the property 
rights of an employer arises from a public program that adjusts 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good and, under ou1 cases, does not constitute a taking requiring 
Government compensation." Id. at 1026. As to the second factor, 
there was no doubt that the statute has an economic impact, but 
it was a necessary consequence of the regulatory scheme. Third, 
employers could not have had reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, because they knew that the field was regulated and thus 
• 
that additional burdens might be imposed. You joined JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR's concurrence in which she emphasized that the challenge 
addressed was only to the statute on its face. 
the government does not have unlimited ability to readjust rights 
Your view is that [ 
and burdens and upset otherwise settled expectations. The possi-
bility remains open that the effect of the statute in a particu-
lar case may be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the Due 
Process Clause. 
These principles establish that the Subsidence Act on its 
face does not "take" petrs' property and very likely will not do 
so even as applied to particular mine owners. First, the Subsi-
?? 
dence Act is an exercise of the state police power. The State is /31,A.,f J-
not taking property for its own use, but instead is "adjust[ing] t--t---
~ 
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good." Id. at 1026. As such, it will not constitute a taking 
unless the interference with property rights is unreasonable. 
Second, petrs focus on the support estate alone in cal-
culating diminution of value. This Court's decisions establish 
that the Court should look to the owner's entire "bundle" of 
property rights in calculating diminution of value. Penn Cen-
tral; Andrus. Petrs' emphasis on the DER requirement that mine 
owners leave 50% of the coal in the support estate in the ground 
is deceiving. Compiled statistics establish that since 1966, the --effective date of the Subsidence Act, mine owners have had to 
leave only approximate ~ of the total coal in the mine to meet 
support requirements. J.A. at 284-287. This percentage of dimi-
nution in value does not constitute a taking. 
Third, even viewing the support estate in isolation as a 
separate property right, the statute on its face only "takes" 50% 
of the estate which is under covered structures. The total per-
centage of coal in the support estate which must be left unmined 
is thus lower than 50%. Even assuming the 50% figure, however, 
the Act does not effect an unconstitutional taking. This Court 
has upheld equal and greater diminutions in value against takings 
challenges. Andrus; Euclid; Hadecheck. 
Fourth, the fact that the Subsidence Act readjusts con-
tract rights, Connolly, and prohibits the most beneficial use of 
the support estate, Andrus, which the owners expected to be able 
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• had were not reasonable in light of the fact that coal mining has 
been a regulated industry since the early 1900's. Connolly. 
~ reposed Syn~ 
• 
As the discussion in the above sections indicate, the 
result in Mahon is no longer in accord with this Court's recent 
decisions under the Takings Clause. First, Mahon accepted a fa-
cial challenge to a state land-use statute instead of requiring 
factual development of the statute's effect on particular proper-
ty. Second, the Court in Mahon found the assumed effect of the 
statute, which was to impair mine owners' use of the coal in the 
support estate, to constitute a taking. The correct result would ~ 
be for the Court to follow the line of its recent decisions and 
~s 
f--·~ -I 
find the challenge premature. Given the confusion which Mahon  
~-?k..~ 
has generated, however, the Court may want to make some observa-
tions about how Mahon fits in with modern takings law in order to 
provide some guidance for the lower courts. In this regard, the .J' ~I-
~ 
Court must decide whether to abandon Mahon or to distinguish it. t>£-, 
the other consideration~~ ~ Although the distinctions are weak, 
~ at the Court has cited Mahon frequently as an example of when 
~ gulation "goes too far." Thus, the Court may be hesitant to r 
overrule it. 
Perhaps the best synthesis of Mahon and modern takings 
law would be for the Court to recognize the change in American 
values regarding land use which has occurred since 1922. The 
balance in 1922 between public policy and investment-backed ex-
pectations came out in favor of the coal companies. Now, the 
public policy in protecting land is stronger because of popula-
• 
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tion growth and the expansion of industry. Petrs' investment-
backed expectations are less compelling because petrs have been 
aware of these changes and have continued to operate in an in-
creasingly regulated industry. Distinguishing Mahon on the basis 
of historical evolution would obviate the need to overrule it in 
order to reach the correct result in this case. 
E. Takings vs~~ Analysis ~~ 
An additional issue is not properly presented 
~~­
in this 
case, but, because it has its genesis in Mahon, may arise. In 
Mahon, Justice Holmes stated, "The general rule at least is, that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 260 U.S . 
at 415. Petrs in this case allege that the Subsidence Act, a 
state regulation, effects a taking. There is debate, however, 
,, J 
over whether a regulation enacted pursuant to a state's police Z ~
power can ever constitute a taking. ___.. Under one view, 
Holmes' statement i n Mahon was merely "metaphorical." 
Justice 
A regula-
tion enacted pursuant to a state's police power can never 




state's power of eminent domain; instead, such a measure may be~~ .... ,• • 
11
_ • ./' 
a ~ ubstant~ 10~ if it intrudes too far on ~~-
I\ , • 
protected property rights. Under this view, if the Court found a ,t. ~
~ 
'~~· state regulation to be overly intrusive, it would simply invali-
date it, ---- not require the State to pay for the property it would be required to do under the Takings Clause. 
/4; ,.......(_ 
taken as ~ 
I pressed ~ r r sent in San 
You ex- ~ ,tO ~ 
4 fl~).· 
view on this issue by joining JUSTICE BRENNAN's dis-
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 
• 
• 
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U.S. 621 (1981). In his dissent, JUSTICE BRENNAN found that "a 
regulation can effect a Fifth Amendment 'taking'". 450 U.S. at 
648. He explicitly rejected the view of numerous courts and com-
mentators that Justice Holmes used the word "taking" only "meta-
phorically." 450 U.S. at 649 n. 14. You have also expressed 
your view that a statute which adjusts benefits and burdens may 
be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the Due Process 
Clause. ~ nnolly, 106 S. Ct. at 1028 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by 
POWELL, J., concurring). Thus, you view the two theories as com-
plementary rather than exclusive. 
This Court has not yet made clear the mode of analysis to 
be employed regarding such a challenge, because it continues to 
review cases in which the challenge is only to the face of the 
statute, not to the statute as applied. In Williamson Company 
Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN set out the controversy, but concluded that the 
Court "need not pass upon the merits of [the question as to 
whether takings or due process analysis is appropriate], for even -
if viewed as a question of due process, respondent's claim is 
premature." 105 S. Ct. at 3124. The Court concluded that the ) 
question of whether a regulation violates the Takings Clause or /+It fj 
the Due Process Clause depends upon how the statute is applied. 
Because this case also presents only a facial challenge, the 
~~---------------------- ---
question of the appropriate mode of inquiry should not be re-
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IV 
Because the contracts signed between surface owners and 
mine owners contain explicit waivers of damage liability, petrs 
argue that the provision of the Subsidence Act which requires 
mine owners to pay for repairs due to subsidence damage violates 
the Contract Clause. The first inquiry is "whether the state law 
has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contrac-
tual relationship." <i1ied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 
U.S. 234, 244 (1978). Resps here concede that by completely re-
versing an important contractual provision, the Subsidence Act 
substantially impairs a contractual relationship. -- - ~ 
If a state regulation constitutes a substantial impair-
ment, the State, in justification, must have a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, United States 
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977), such as the reme-
dying of a broad and general social or economic problem. Energy 
, 
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983). 
Here, the legislature expressly found that subsidence damage dev-
IL 
,, 




; d ,,. 
~
safety and welfare of the State and its residents. The legisla-  
~-
ture also concluded that damage payments to surface owners would .5..-e..., p I :3 
go toward repair of the subsidence damage, thus preserving the •' / za: 1':: 
~
state's limited tax base and land available for development. 
Petrs do not contest the validity of these state goals. 
Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the 
next inquiry is whether the adjustment of "the rights and respon-
sibilities of contracting parties [is basea) upon reasonable con-
- - page 18. 
• ditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying [the legislature's] adoption." Energy Reserves Group, 
459 U.S. at 412 (quoting United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22). 
"Unless the State itself is a contracting party, '[als is custom-
ary in reviewing economic and social regulation, ..• courts prop-
erly defer to legislative judgments as to the necessity and rea-
sonableness of a particular measure.'" Ibid. The CA3 correctly 
recognized that the standards of review under the Contract Cl ause 
differ according to whether or not the State is a party to the 
• 
contract. Petrs' primary argument is that the standards do not 
L..---
differ. As is obvious from the quote above, they do. Petrs do 
not argue that the State is in fact a party to the contracts at 
issue. Thus, petrs are wrong in asserting that the more rigorous 
standard appl i ed to contracts where the State is a party should 
apply in this case. 
Applying the appropriate standard, there appears to be 
little reason not; ' to defer to the legis l ature's judgment regard-
ing the necessity and reasonableness of the Subsidence Act. The 
legislative history indicates that the legislature percieved a 
public need to remedy subsidence. The statutory provision at 
issue is, on its face, tied to that end. The Subsidence Act pro-
vision thus survives Contract Clause scrutiny. 
case. 
V 
In sum, it is difficult to distinguish Mahon from this 
The Act does not preclude economically viable use of 
• petrs' property and thus is constitutional on its face. Any 
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• similarity between this case and Mahon, however, the Court may 
want to indicate that even petrs' allegations if taken as true do ? < 
✓ 
• 
not lead to the conclusion that the Subsidence Act effects a tak-
ing of petrs' property. The best distinction between this case 
and Mahon may be that historical circumstances require a differ-
ent balance between the public and pr iv ate interests than was 
required in 1922. Because petrs only challenge the Act on its 
face, it is not appropriate in this case to resolve the issue of 
whether takings analysis or due process analysis is proper in a 
challenge to a regulation enacted pursuant to a state's police 
power. The Act also survives scrutiny under the Contract Clause 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Leslie 
MEMORANDUM 
October 10, 1986 
No. 85-1092, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus 
You requested that I expore alterate results in this 
"taking" case. There are two ways in which you could decide 
this case other than finding the Pennsylvania statute dis-
tinguishable from the one at issue in Mahon. A rationale 
for both positions follows so that you can compare the rela-
tive strength of either position. 
I. The Pennsylvania Statute is Facially Unconstitutional 
There is no rational way to distinguish the statute 
at issue in Mahon from the one at issue in this case. In 
Mahon, the Court recognized "that while property may be reg-
ulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
• 
• 
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will be recognized as a taking." 260 U.S. at 415. A regu-
lation "goes too far" "where the effects completely deprive 
the owner of all or most of his interest in property." San 
Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., joined by Powell, 
J., dissenting). This Court has recognized that "[a] court 
cannot determine whether a regulation 'goes too far' unless 
it knows how far the regulation goes." MacDonald, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2566. Thus, this Court has rejected a number of fa-
cial challenges to land-use statutes as premature. MacDon-
ald; Hamilton Bank; Hodel. But, in this case, the statute 
~ 
is absolutely clear on its face how far it goes. The stat-
~ 
ute unequivocally requires that coal mine owners leave 50% --
of the coal under protected structures in the ground. More----
over, the record in this case clearly indicates that petrs 
have been forced to leave over 30 million tons of coal in 
the ground pursuant to the statute's requirements. The 
Court has also recognized that a land-use regulation is 
-----invalid on its face if it "denies an owner economically via-
ble use of his land." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 296 (quoting 
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). This record provides a sufficient 
basis for finding the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional. 
This Court has recognized that a land-use regulation 
may deprive a property owner of a beneficial use or even the 
most beneficial use of his property without constituting a 
taking. Andrus. According to the Court, "Taking jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments 
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular seg-
- - page 3. 
• ment have been entirely abrogated." Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
• 
at 130. Resp argues that the coal required to be left in 
the ground is merely part of the overall "parcel" of petrs' 
land rights. Under this analysis, the statute has thus far 
required petrs to leave only 1-9% of their total coal hold-
ings in the ground. But, this is not the proper analysis 
because the value of the property regulated "lies •.• solely 
in its coal." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) . In an analogous situation, a statute could not con-
~ - ---------. 
stitutionally require that an owner of a 100 acre lot cede 
~ _______..._,_ ~ ~ ~ 
to the state 5 of those acres. This would constitute a tak-
ing and the state would be required to pay just compensa-
tion. This case presents the same situation. In Penn Cen-
tral, the Court distinguished Mahon on the basis that in 
Mahon, the "full use of [property] rights [was] so bound up 
with the investment-backed expectations of appellants that 
governmental deprivation of these rights invariably -- i.e., 
irrespective of the impact of the restriction on the value 
of the parcel as a whole -- constitute[d] a 'taking.'" 438 
U.S. at 130 n. 27. Just as in Mahon, a requirement re-
stricting the mining of underground coal, whose only value 
is in its ability to be mined and sold, constitutes a taking 





of his property. ~ 
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II. The Statute is Facially Valid, 
But May Constitute a Taking as Applied 
This Court has recognized that the "ad hoc, factual 
inquiry" necessary to a takings claim "must be conducted 
with respect to specific property, and the particular esti-
mates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in 
the unique circumstances." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295. In Ma-
hon, the Court found p n almost identical statut, to frus-
trate the reasonable invetment backed expections of the coal 
ri~ 
owners. Pfttrs in this case, however, concede that they 
r----
"have yet to offer proofs relating to the nature of their 
investment backed expectations." J.A. at 15. Thus, the 
present challenge is only to the statute on its face. The 
sole question presented in a facial challenge to a land-use 
regulation is whether it "denies an owner economically via-
ble use of his land." 452 U.S. at 296. The record on this 
issue is not yet fully developed. Consequently, "it is pre-
mature t~ sider questions under the Compensation 
Clause." 452 U.S. at 306 {Powell, J., concurring). 
I;, is important to emphasize, however, that, as in 
Hodel, the Court's decision "is confined to a holding that 
the Act ... is not facially unconstitutional .... The 'tak-
ing' issue remains available to, and may be litigated by, 
any owner or lessee whose property interest is adversely 
affected by the enforcement of the Act." 452 U.S. at 306. 
I write separately to emphasize that the Act, as applied, 
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I coal" in Pennsylvania. 452 U.S. at 305. In fact, the Penn-
sylvania statute, which restricts the mining of underground 
coal, could more seriously affect coal owners than the fed-
eral surface mining statute at issue in Hodel. In address-
ing petrs' argument in Hodel that the federal statute was 
facially unconstitutional because it "prohibit[ed) any sur-
face coal mining in certain areas," the Court noted that the 
statute was not invalid because it "[did) not proscribe 
• 
nonmining uses of such land." 452 U.S. at 296 n. 37. Here, 
petrs' argue, with substantial justification, that the Penn-
sylvania statute deprives them of .fil!Y.. use of their coal 
holdings which are required to be left underground. More-
over, even if a coal owner's investment backed expectations 
are evaluated against his entire coal holdings, a particular 
coal owner could establish that the statute effects a tak-
ing. Al though resp claims that the statute's effect thus 
far has been to require coal owners to leave only 1-9% of 
their total coal holdings in the ground, a particular coal 
owner could show in a particular case that the effect on his 
holdings was substantially more severe. 
In sum, questions as to the validity of the statute 
as applied in particular cases must wait for another day. 
At this point it is important only to recognize that these 
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the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, 
since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when 
the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Further-
more, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety. 
That could be provided for by notice. Indeed the very 
foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave timely 
notice of its intent to mine under the house. On the 
other hand the extent of the taking is great. It pur-
ports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as 
an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and what is 
declared by the Court )>,,elow to be a contract hitherto 
binding the plaintiffs/ /1f we were called upon to deal 
with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear 
that the statute does not disclose a public interest suffi-
cient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defend-
ant's constitutionally protected rights. 
But the case has been treated as one in which the gen- \ 
eral vali · of the act should be discussed. The Attorney 
~al of the State, the City of cranton, and the repre-
sentatives of other extensive interests were allowed to \ 
take part in the argument below and have submitted their 
contentions here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to 
go farther in the statement of our opinion, in order that 
it may be known at once, and that further suits should 
not be brought in vain .. ,1 
It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an 
exercise of ~er,soTarasifaff ects the mining 
ofcoaluooer streets or cities in places where the right to 
mine such coal has been :reserved. As said in a Pennsyl-
vania case, "For practical purposes, the right to coal con-
sists in the right to mine it." Commonw'ialth v: Clear-
view oa o., 6 a. . 328, 331. What makes the 
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with 
profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine 
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitu-
tional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. This 
{, 
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we think that we are warranted in assuming that the 
statute does. 
It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
232 U.S. 531, it was held competent for the legislature to 
require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoin-
ing property, that, with the pillar on the other -side of the 
line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety of the em-
ployees of either mine in case the other should be aban-
doned and allowed to fill with water. But that was a re-
quirement for the safety of employees invited into the 
mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage 
that has been recognized as a justification of various laws. 
The rights of the public in a streel purchased or laid 
out by eminent domain are those that it has paid for. If 
in any case its representatives have been so short sighted 
as to acquire only surface rights without the right of sup-
port, we see no more authority for supplying the latter 
without compensation than there was for talcing the right 
of way in the first place and refusing to pay for it because 
the public wanted it very much. The protection of pri-
vate property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that 
it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not 
be taken for such use without compensation. A similar 
assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 
208 U. S. 598, 605. When this seemingly absolute protec-
tion is found to be qualified by the police power, the 
natural tendency of human nature is to extend the quali-
fication more and more until at last private property 
disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way 
under the Constitution of the United States. 
The general rule at least is, that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking. It may be doubted how far 
exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a 
conflagration, go-and if they go beyond the gen_eral rule, 
• I 
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whether they do not stand as much upon tradition as upon 
principle. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16. In general 
it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities will 
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's shoulders. 
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 489. 
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire 
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change. As we already have 
said, this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be 
disposed of by general propositions. But we regard this 
as going beyond any of the cases decided by this Court. 
The late decisions upon laws dealing with the congestion 
of Wa;hington and New York, caused by the war, dealt 
with laws intended to meet a temporary emergency and 
providing for compensation determined to be reasonable 
by an impartial board. They went to the verge of the law 
hut fell far short of the present act. Block v. Hirsh, 206 
U. S. 135. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 
U.S. 170. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242. 
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon 
the conviction that an exigency existed that would war-
rant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would 
warrant the exercise of eminent domain. But the question 
at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired 
should fall. So far as private p~ons or communities 
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surf ace . 
rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has 
become a danger warrants the giving to them greater 
rights than they bought. 
Decree reversed. 
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, dissenting. 
The Kohler Act prohibits, under certain conditions, the 
mining of anthracite coal within the limits of a city in 
such a manner or to surh an extent" as to cause the ... 
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SlJPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1092 
KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NICHOLAS DEBENE-
DICTIS, SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL RESOURCES, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), 
the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania 
statute that admittedly destroyed "previously existing rights 
of property and contract." Id., at 413. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Holmes explained: 
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent val-
ues incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law. As 
long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an im-
plied limitation and must yield to the police power. But 
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or 
the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact 
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent 
of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. 
So the question depends upon the particular facts." 
Ibid. 
In that case the "particular facts" led the Court to hold that 
the Pennsylvania legislature had gone beyond its constitu-
- -
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tional powers when it enacted a statute prohibiting the min-
ing of anthracite coal in a manner that would cause the subsi-
dence of land on which certain structures were located. 
Now, 65 years later, we address a different set of "particu-
lar facts," involving the Pennsylvania legislature's 1966 con-
clusion that the Commonwealth's existing mine subsidence 
legislation had failed to protect the public interest in safety, 
land conservation, preservation of affected municipalities' tax 
bases, and land development in the Commonwealth. Based 
on detailed findings, the legislature enacted the Bituminous 
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (the "Subsi-
dence Act" or the "Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 52, § 1406.1 et 
seq. (Purdon 1984-1985 supp.). Petitioners contend, relying 
heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania Coal, that§ 4 and § 6 
of the Subsidence Act and certain implementing regulations 
violate the Takings Clause, and that § 6 of the Act violates 
the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that Pennsyl-
vania Coal cioes not control for several reasons and that our 
subsequent cases make it clear that neither § 4 nor § 6 is un-
constitutional on its face. We agree. 
I 
Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a 
coal mine, including the land surface, caused by the extrac-
tion of underground coal. This lowering of the strata can 
have devastating effects. 1 It of ten causes substantial dam-
age to foundations , walls, other structural members and the 
integrity of houses and buildings. Subsidence frequently 
causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land diffi-
1 See generally Lee & Abel, Subsidence from Underground Mining: 
Environmental Analysis and Planning Considerations 2-12 (Dept. of the 
Interior 1983); Mavrolas & Schechtman, Coal Mine Subsidence 6-8 (1981); 
Blazey & Strain, Deep Mine Subsidence-State Law and the Federal Re-
sponse, 1 Eastern Mineral Law Foundation 1, 1-5 (1980); Moebs, Subsi-
dence Damage Over Four Room-and-Pillar Sections in Southwestern Penn-
sylvania, (Dept. of the Interior (1982); H. Rep. No 96-218, at 126 (1977). 
- -
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cult or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been 
well documented-many subsided areas cannot be plowed or 
properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of 
groundwater and surface ponds. 2 In short, it presents the 
type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so 
much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades. 3 
Despite what their name may suggest, neither of the "full 
extraction" mining methods currently used in western Penn-
sylvania 4 enables miners to extract all subsurface coal; con-
siderable amounts need to be left in the ground to provide ac-
cess, support and ventilation to the mines. Additionally, 
mining companies have long been required by various Penn-
sylvania laws and regulations, the legitimacy of which is not 
challenged here, to leave coal in certain areas for public 
safety reasons. 5 Since 1966, Pennsylvania has placed an ad-
ditional set of restrictions on the amount of coal that may be 
extracted; these restrictions are designed to diminish subsi-
z ''Wherever [subsidence effects] extend, damage can occur to buildings, 
roads, pipelines, cables, streams, water impoundments, wells, and aqui-
fers. Buildings can be cracked or tilted; roads can be lowered or cracked; 
streams, water impoundments, and aquifers can all be drained into the un-
derground excavations. Oil and gas wells can be severed, causing their 
contents to migrate into underground mines, into aquifers, and even into 
residential basements. Sewage lines, gas lines, and water lines can all be 
severed, as can telephone and electric cables." Blazey & Strain, su:pra, at 
1-3. 
3 Indeed, in 1977, Congress passed the Federal Surface Mining Control 
and Rehabilitation Act, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U. S. C. § 1201, et. seq., which in-
cludes regulation of subsidence caused by underground coal mining. See 
30 U. S. C. § 1266. 
• The two "full extraction" coal mining methods in use in W estem Penn-
sylvania are the room and pillar method, and the longwall method. App. 
90-91. 
5 For example, the Gas Operations Well-Drilling Petroleum and Coal 
Mining Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 52, § 2101 et seq. (Purdon), requires miners 
to leave in place the coal in a 300 foot radius around the casings of oil and 
gas wells. Another statute requires that coal beneath and adjacent to cer-
tain large surface bodies of water be left in place. Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 52, 
§ 3101 et seq. (Purdon). 
- -
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dence and subsidence -damage in the vicinity of certain struc-
tures and areas. 
Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act authorizes the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to im-
plement and enforce a comprehensive program to prevent or 
minimize subsidence and to regulate its consequences. Sec-
tion 4 of the Subsidence Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 52, § 1406.4, 
prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to three cat-
egories of structures that were in place on April 17, 1966: 
public buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used 
by the public; dwellings used for human habitation; and ce~e-
teries. 6 Since 1966 the DER has applied a formula that gen-
s Section 4 provides: 
"Protection of surface structures against damage from cave-in, collapse, or 
subsidence 
"In order to guard the health, safety and general welfare of the public, 
no owner, operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or 
other person in charge of or having supervision over any bituminous coal 
mine shall mine bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result of the 
caving-in, collapse or subsidence of the following surface structures in 
place on April 27, 1966, overlying or in the proximity of the mine: 
"(1) Any public building or any noncommercial structure customarily 
used by the public, including but not being limited to churches, schools, 
hospitals , and municipal utilities or municipal public service operations. 
"(2) Any dwelling used for human habitation; and 
"(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground; unless the current owner of 
the structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired or 
compensated." 
In response to the enactment in 1977 of the Federal Surface Mining Con-
trol and Rehabilitation Act, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U. S. C. § 1201, et. seq. , and 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior in 1979, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 14,902, the Pennsylvania DER adopted new regulations extending 
the 50% rule to additional classes of buildings and surface features. 
Particularly, 
"(a) public buildings and non-commercial buildings customarily used by 
the public after April 27, 1966, including churches, schools, hospitals, 
courthouses, and government offices; 
"(b) impoundments of water with the storage volume of 20 acre feet or 
more and perennial streams; 
- -
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erally requires 50% of the coal beneath structures protected 
by § 4 to be kept in place as a means of providing surface sup-
port. 7 Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
Tit. 52, § 1406.6, authorizes the DER to revoke a mining per-
mit if the removal of coal causes damage to a structure or 
area protected by § 4 and the operator has not within six 
months-either repaired the damage, satisfied any claim aris-
ing therefrom, or deposited a sum equal to the reasonable 
cost of repair with the DER as security. 8 • 
II 
In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylva-
"(c) aquifers which serve as a significant source of water for a public 
water system; and 
"(d) coal refuse disposal areas." 25 Pa. Code § 89.145(a) and 
§ 89.146(b). 
1 The regulations define the zone for which the 50% rule applies: 
"(2) The support area shall be rectangular in shape and determined by 
projecting a 15 degree angle of draw from the surface to the coal seam, 
beginning 15 feet from each side of the structure. For a structure on 
a surface slope of 5.0% or greater, the support area on the downslope 
side of the structure shall be extended an additional distance, deter-
mined by multiplying the depth of the overburden by the percentage 
of the surface slope." 25 Pa. Code § 89.146(b). 
However, this 50% requirement is neither an absolute floor nor ceiling. 
It may be waived by the Department upon a showing that alternative 
measures will prevent subsidence damage. 25 Pa. Code § 89.146(b)(5). 
Alternatively, more stringent measures may be imposed, or mining may be 
prohibited, if it appears that leaving 50% of the coal in place will not pro-
vide adequate support. 25 Pa. Code § 89.146(b)(4). 
8 Although some subsidence eventually occurs over every underground 
mine, the extent and timing of the subsidence depends upon a number of 
factors, including the depth of the mining, the geology of the overlying 
strata, the topography of the surface, and the method of coal removal. 
The DER believes that the support provided by its 50% rule will last in 
almost all cases for the life of the structure being protected. Since 1966, 
petitioners have mined under approximately 14,000 structures or areas 
protected by § 4; there have been subsidence damage claims with respect to 
only 300. Stip. of Counsel 41 and 42, App. 90. 
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nia seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from enforcing the 
Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations. The peti-
tioners are an association of coal mine operators, and four 
corporations that are engaged, either directly or through 
affiliates, in underground mining of bituminous coal in west-
ern Pennsylvania. The members of the association and the 
corporate petitioners own, lease, or otherwise control sub-
stantial coal reserves beneath the surface of property af-
fected by the Subsidence Act. The defendants in the action, 
respondents here, are the Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the Chief of DER's Division of Mine Subsi-
dence, and the Chief of DER's Section on Mine Subsidence 
Regulation. 
The complaint alleges that Pennsylvania recognizes three 
separate estates in land: The mineral estate; the surface es-
tate; and the "support estate." Beginning well over 100 
years ago, land owners began severing title to underground 
coal and the right of surface support while retaining or con-
veying away ownership of the surface estate. It is stipu-
lated that approximately 90% of the coal that is or will be 
mined by petitioners in western Pennsylvania was severed 
from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920. 
When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners 
or their predecessors typically acquired or retained certain 
additional rights that would enable them to extract and re-
move the coal. Thus, they acquired the right to deposit 
wastes, to provide for drainage and ventilation, and to erect 
facilities such as tipples, roads, or railroads, on the surface. 
Additionally, they typically acquired a waiver of any claims 
for damages that might result from the removal of the coal. 
In the portions of the complaint that are relevant to us, pe-
titioners alleged that both § 4 of the Subsidence Act, as im-
plemented by the 50% rule, and § 6 of the Subsidence Act, 
constitute a taking of their private property without com-
pensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. They also alleged that § 6 impairs their contractual 
- -
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agreements in violation of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution. 9 
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts pertaining to 
petitioners' facial challenge, and filed cross motio:Qs for sum-
mary judgment on the facial challenge. The District Court 
granted respondent's motion. 
In rejecting petitioners' Takings Clause claim, the District 
Court first distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, primarily on 
the ground that the Subsidence Act served valid public pur-
poses that the Court had found lacking in the earlier case. 
581 F. Supp. 511, 516 (1984). The District Court found that 
the restriction on the use of petitioners' property was an ex-
ercise of the Commonwealth's police power, justified by 
Pennsylvania's interest in health, safety, and general welfare 
of the public. In answer to petitioners' argument that the 
Subsidence Act effectuated a taking because a separate, rec-
ognized interest in realty-tlie support estate-had been en-
tirely destroyed, the District Court concluded that under 
Pennsylvania law the support estate consists of a bundle of 
rights, including some that were not affected by the Act. 
That the right to cause damage to the surface may constitute 
the most valuable "strand" in the bundle of rights possessed 
by the owner of a support estate was not considered control-
ling under our decision in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 
(1979). 
In rejecting petitioners' Contracts Clause claim, the Dis-
trict Court noted that there was no contention that the Subsi-
dence Act or the DER regulations had impaired any contract 
to which the Commonwealth was a party. Since only private 
contractual obligations had been impaired, the court consid-
ered it appropriate to defer to the legislature's determina-
tions concerning the public purposes served by the legisla-
tion. The court found that the adjustment of the rights of 
the contracting parties was tailored to those "significant and 
9 Petitioners also challenged various other portions of the Subsidence 
Act below, see 771 F. 2d 707, 718-719 (1985); 581 F. Supp. 511, 513, 
519-529 (1984), but have not pursued these claim in this Court. 
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legitimate" public purposes. 581 F. Supp., at 514. At the 
parties' request, the District Court certified the facial chal-
lenge for appeal. · · 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Pennsylva-
nia Coal does not control because the Subsidence Act is a le-
gitimate means of "protect[ing] the environment of the Com-
monwealth, its economic future, and its well-being." 771 F. 
2d 707, 715 (1985). The Court of Appeals' analysis of the 
Subsidence Act's effect on petitioners' property differed 
somewhat from the District Court's, however. In rejecting 
the argument that the support estate had been entirely de-
stroyed, the Court of Appeals did not rely on the fact that the 
support estate itself constitutes a bundle of many rights, but 
rather considered the support estate as just one segment of a 
larger bundle of rights that invariably includes either the sur-
face estate or the mineral estate. As Judge Adams 
explained: 
"To focus upon the support estate separately when as-
sessing the diminution of the value of plaintiffs' property 
caused by the Subsidence Act therefore would serve lit-
tle purpose. The support estate is more properly 
viewed as only one 'strand' in the plaintiff's 'bundle' of 
property rights, which also includes the mineral estate. 
As the Court stated in Andrus, "[t]he destruction of one 
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggre-
gate must be viewed in its entirety." 444 U. S. at 65. 
The use to which the mine operators wish to put the sup-
port estate is forbidden. However, because the plain-
tiffs still possess valuable mineral rights that enable 
them profitably to mine coal, subject only to the Subsi-
dence Act's requirement that they prevent subsidence, 
their entire 'bundle' of property rights has not been de-
stroyed." 771 F. 2d, at 716. 
With respect to the Contracts Clause claim, the Court of 
Appeals agreed with the District Court that a higher degree 
of deference should be afforded to legislative determinations 
- -
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respecting economic and social legislation affecting wholly 
private contracts then when the state impairs its own agree-
ments. The court held that the impairment of private agree-
ments effectuated by the Subsidence Act was justified by the 
legislative finding ''that subsidence damage devastated many 
surface structures and thus endangered the health, safety, 
and economic welfare of the Commonwealth and its people." 
771 F. 2d, at 718. We granted certiorari, 475 U. S. --
(1986), and now affirm. 
III 
Petitioners assert that disposition of their takings claim 10 
calls for no more than a straightforward application of the 
Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra. 
Although there are some obvious similarities between the 
cases, we agree with the Court of Appeals and the District 
Court that the similarities are far less significant than the dif-
ferences, and that Pennyslvania Coal does not control this 
case. 
In Pennsylvania Coal, the Pennsylvania Coal Company 
had served notice on Mr. and Mrs. Mahon that the company's 
mining operations beneath their premises would soon reach a 
point that would cause subsidence to the surface. The Ma-
hons filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the coal company 
from removing any coal that would cause ''the caving in, col-
lapse or subsidence" of their dwelling. The bill acknowl-
edged that the Mahons owned only ''the surface or right of 
soil" in the lot, and that the Coal Company had reserved the 
right to remove the coal without any liability to the owner of 
the surface estate. Nonetheless, the Mahons asserted that 
Pennsylvania's then recently enacted Kohler Act, which pro-
hibited mining that caused subsidence under certain struc-
tures, entitled them to an injunction. 
10 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U. S. Const., Arndt. V. This restriction is applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. 
v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897). 
- - -
85-1092-0PINION 
10 KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSN. v. DEBENEDICTIS 
After initially having entered a preliminary injunction 
pending a hearing on the merits, the· Chancellor soon dis-
solved it, observing: 
"[T]he plaintiffs' bill contains no averment on which to 
base by implication or otherwise any finding of fact that 
any interest public or private is involved in the defend-
ant's proposal to mine the coal except the private inter-
est of the plaintiffs in the prevention of private injury." 
App. in Pennsylvania Coal, supra, p. 23. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, concluding 
that the Kohler Act was a proper exercise of the police 
power. 274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922). One Justice dis-
sented. He concluded that the Kohler Act was not actually 
intended to protect lives and safety, but rather was special 
legislation enacted for the sole benefit of the surface owners 
who had released their right to support. Id., at 512-518, 118 
A., at 499-501. 
The company promptly appealed to this Court, asserting 
that the impact of the statute was so severe that "a serious 
shortage of domestic fuel is threatened." Motion to Advance 
for Argument in Pennsylvania Coal, supra, p. 3. The com-
pany explained that until the Court ruled, ''no anthracite coal 
which is likely to cause surface subsidence can be mined," and 
that strikes were threatened throughout the anthracite coal 
fields. 11 In its argument in this Court, the Company con-
tended that the Kohler Act was not a bona fide exercise of 
the police power, but in reality was nothing more than ''rob-
bery under the forms of law'' because its purpose was "not to 
protect the lives or safety of the public generally but merely 
to augment the property rights of a fav;ored few." See 260 
U. S., at 396-398. 
11 The urgency with which the case was treated is evidenced by the fact 
that the Court issued its decision less than a month after oral argument; a 
little over a year after the test case had been commenced. 
' - -
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Over Justice Brandeis' dissent, this Court accepted the 
company's argument. In his opinion for the Court, Justice 
Holmes first characteristically decided the specific case at 
hand in a single, terse paragraph: 
"This is the case of a single private house. No doubt 
there is a public interest even in this, as there is in every 
purchase and sale and in all that happens within the com-
monwealth. Some existing rights may be modified even 
in such a case. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368. But 
usually in ordinary private affairs the public interest 
does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A 
source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance 
even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different 
places. The damage is not common or public. Wesson 
v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 103. The extent of 
the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, 
since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when 
the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Further-
more, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety. 
That could be provided for by notice. Indeed the very 
foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave timely 
notice of its intent to mine under the house. On the 
other hand the extent of the taking is great. It purports 
to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an es-
tate in land-a very valuable estate-and what is de-
clared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto bind-
ing the plaintiffs. If we were called upon to deal with 
the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that 
the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient 
to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's 
constitutionally protected rights." 260 U. S., at 
413-414. 
Then-uncharacteristically--J ustice Holmes provided the 
parties with an advisory opinion discussing "the general va-
I - -
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lidity of the Act." 12 In the advisory portion of the Court's 
opinion, Justice Holmes rested on two propositions, both crit-
ical to the Court's decision. First, because it served only 
private interests, not health or safety, the Kohler Act could 
not be "sustained as an exercise of the police power." Id., at 
414. Second, the statute made it "commercially impracti-
cable" to mine "certain coal" in the areas affected by the Koh-
ler Act. 13 
The holdings and assumptions of the Court in Pennsylva-
nia Coal provide obvious and necessary reasons for distin-
guishing Pennsylvania Coal from the case before us today. 
The two factors that the Court considered relevant, have be-
come integral parts of our takings analysis. We have held 
that land use regulation can effect a taking if it "does not ad-
vance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 
255, 260 (1980); see also Penn Central Transporlalion Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978). Application of 
these tests to petitioners' challenge demonstrates that they 
have not satisfied their burden of showing that the Subsi-
a "But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of 
the act should be discussed. The Attorney General of the State, the 
City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests 
were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted 
'their contentions here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go far-
ther in the statement of our opinion, in order that it may be known at 
once, and that further suits should not be brought in vain." 260 
U. S., at 414. 
13 "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised 
with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal 
has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriat-
ing or destroying it. This we think that we are warranted in assuming 
that the statute does." Id., at 414-415. 
This assumption was not unreasonable in view of the fact that the Kohler 
Act may be read to prohibit mining that causes any subsidence-not just 
subsidence that results in damage to surface structures. The record in 
this case indicates that subsidence will almost always occur eventually. 
See n. 8, supra. 
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dence Act constitutes a taking. First, unlike the Kohler 
Act, the character of the governmental action involved here 
leans heavily against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a sig-
nificant threat to the common welfare. Second, there is no 
record in this case to support a finding, similar to the one the 
Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act 
makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in 
their business, or that there has been undue interference 
with their investment-backed expectations. 
The Public Purpose 
Unlike the Kohler Act, which was passed upon in Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a 
balancing of the private economic interests of coal companies 
against the private interests of the surface owners. The 
Pennsylvania legislature specifically found that important 
public interests are served by enforcing a policy that is de-
signed to minimize subsidence in certain areas. Section 2 of 
the Subsidence Act provides: 
"This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the po-
lice powers of the Commonwealth for the protection of 
the health, safety and general welfare of the people of 
the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of 
surface land areas which may be affected in the mining of 
bituminous coal by methods other than 'open pit' or 
'strip' mining, to aid in the protection of the safety of the 
public, to enhance the value of such lands for taxation, to 
aid in the preservation of surface water drainage and 
public water supplies and generally to improve the use 
and enjoyment of such lands and to maintain primary ju-
risdiction over surface mining in Pennsylvania." Pa. 
Ann. Stat. Tit. 52, § 1406.2. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were both con-
- -
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vinced that the legislative purposes 1• set forth in the statute 
were genuine, substantial and legitimate, and we have no 
reason to conclude otherwise. 15 
None of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the bene-
fit of private parties identified in Justice Holmes' opinion are 
present here. First, Justice Holmes explained that the Koh-
ler Act was a "private benefit" statute since it "ordinarily did 
not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of 
the coal." 260 U. S., at 414. The Subsidence Act, by con-
trast, has no such exception. The current surface owner 
may only waive the protection of the Act if the DER con-
sents. See 25 Pa. Code §89.145(b). Moreover, the Court 
was forced to reject the Commonwealth's safety justification 
for the Kohler Act because it found that the Commonwealth's 
interest in safety could as easily have been accomplished 
through a notice requirement to landowners. The Subsi-
dence Act, by contrast, · is designed to accomplish a number of 
widely varying interests, with reference to which petitioners 
have not suggested alternative methods through which the 
Commonwealth could proceed. 
Petitioners argue that at least § 6, which requires coal com-
panies to repair subsidence damage or pay damages to those 
who suffer subsidence damage, is unnecessary because the 
Commonwealth administers an insurance program that ade-
quately reimburses surface owners for the cost of repairing 
their property. But this argument rests on the mistaken 
premise that the statute was motivated by a desire to protect 
private parties. In fact, however, the public purpose that 
motivated the enactment of the legislation is served by pre-
venting the damage from occurring in the first place-in the 
"The legislature also set forth rather detailed findings about the dan-
gers of subsidence and the need for legislation. See Pa. Ann. Stat. Tit. 52, 
§ 1406.3. 
a "We are not disposed to displace the considered judgment of the Court 
of Appeals on an issue whose resolution is so contingent upon an analysis of 
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words of the statute- "by providing for the conservation of 
surface land areas." Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 52, § 1406.2. · The 
requirement that the mine operator assume the financial 
responsibility for the repair of damaged structures deters the 
operator from causing the damage at all-the Common-
wealth's main goal- whereas an insurance program would 
merely reimburse the surface owner after the damage 
occurrs.16 
Thus, the Subsidence Act differs from the Kohler Act in 
critical and dispositive respects. With regard to the Kohler 
Act, the Court believed that the Commonwealth had acted 
only to ensure against damage to some private landowners' 
homes. Justice Holmes stated that if the private individuals 
needed support for their structures, they should not have 
''take[n] the risk of acquiring only surface rights." 260 
U. S., at 416. Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is act-
ing to protect the public interest in health, the environment, 
and the fiscal integrity of the area. That private individuals 
erred in taking a risk cannot estop the state from exercising 
its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance. 
The Subsidence Act is a prime example that "circumstances 
may so change in time ... as to clothe with a [public] interest 
what at other times . . . would be a matter of purely private 
concern." Block v. Hirsh , 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921). 
In Pennsylvania Coal the Court recognized that the na-
ture of the state's interest in the regulation is a critical factor 
in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus 
"We do not suggest that courts are to undertake "least restrictive alter-
native" analysis in deciding whether a state regulatory scheme is designed 
to remedy a public harm or to provide private benefits. The Court's 
examination of the necessity of the regulation in Pennsylvania Coal was 
simply designed to determine whether the stated interest was a sham, as 
the coal company argued. That a land use regulation may be somewhat 
overinclusive or underinclusive is, of course, no justification for rejecting 
it. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 359, 388-389 (1926). 
~ - -
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whether compensation is required. 11 The Court distin-
guished the case before it from a case it had decided eight 
years earlier, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 
531 (1914). There, too, coal companies challenged a Pennsyl-
vania statute requiring them to leave certain amounts of coal 
in their mines, but the Court held that there was no taking. 
The Pennsylvania Coal Court explained that Plymouth Coal 
dealt" with "a requirement for the safety of the employees in-
vited into the mine, and secured an average.reciprocity of ad-
vantage that has been recognized as a justification of various 
laws." 260 U. S., at 415. 
Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal have rec-
ognized that the nature of the state's action is critical in 
takings analysis. 18 In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 673 
(1887), for example, a Kansas distiller who had built a brew-
ery while it was legal to do so, challenged a Kansas Constitu-
11 In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the state has an absolute 
right to prohibit land use that amounts to a public nuisance. 260 U. S., at 
417. Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court did not contest that proposi-
tion, but instead took issue with Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the Koh-
ler Act represented such a prohibition. Id., at 413-414. 
18 Of course, the type of taking alleged is also an often critical factor. It 
is well settled that a "'taking' may more readily be found when the inter-
ference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by gov-
ernment, see, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central 
Tranportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978). While the 
Court has almost invariably found that the permanent physical occupation 
of property constitutes a taking, see Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U. S. 
419, 476-478 (1982), the Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that de-
stroy or adversely affect real property interests. See, e. g., Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U. S. - (1986); Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 125 (1978); Eastlake 
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S. 668, 674 n. 8 (1976); Goldblatt 
v. Hempstea.d, 369 U. S. 590, 592-593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch 
v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 (1909). This case, of course, involves land use 
regulation, not a physical appropriation of petitioners' property. 
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tional amendment which prohibited the manufacture and sale 
of intoxicating liquors. Although the Court recognized that 
the "buildings and machinery constituting these breweries 
are of little value" because of the Amendment, id., at 657, 
Justice Harlan explained that a 
"prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injuri-
ous to the health, morals, or safety of the community, 
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appro-
priation of property . . . . The power which the States 
have of prohibiting such m~e by individuals of their prop-
erty as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or 
the safety of the public, is not-and, consistently with . 
the existence and safety of organized society cannot be-
burdened with the condition that the State must compen-
sate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they 
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a 
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the 
community." Id., at 669. 
See also Plymouth Coal Co., supra; Hadacheck v. Los Ange-
les, 239 U. S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 
171 (1914); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888). 
We reject petitioners' implicit assertion that Pennsylvania 
Coal overruled these cases which focused so heavily on the 
nature of the state's interest in the regulation. Just five 
years after the Pennsylvania Coal decision, Justice Holmes 
joined the Court's unanimous decision in Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U. S. 272 (1928), holding that the Takings Clause did not 
require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of ce-
dar rust trees for the value of the. trees that the State had 
ordered destroyed. The trees needed to be destroyed to 
prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards, 
which represented a far more valuable resource. In uphold-
ing the state action, the Court did not consider it necessary to 
''weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars 
constitute a nuisance according to common law; or whether 
- -
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they may be so declared by statute." Id., at 280. Rather, it 
was clear that the State's exercise of its police power to pre-
vent the impending danger was justified, and did not require 
compensation. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U. S. 359 (1926); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States , 
261 U. S. 502, 509 (1923). Other subsequent cases reaffirm 
the important role that the nature of the state action plays in 
our takings analysis. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 
590 (1961); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 
20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P . 2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 
U. S. 36 (1962). As the Court explained in Goldblatt: "Al-
though a comparison of values before and after" a regulatory 
action "is relevant . .. it is by no means conclusive . . . " 369 
U. S. , at 594. 19 
The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the state 
merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to 
public nuisances is consistent with the notion of ''reciprocity 
of advantage" that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylva-
nia Coal.'}JJ Under our system of government, one of the 
1
• See also Agins v. City of Ti'lruron, 447 U. S. 255, 261 (1980) (the ques-
tion of whether a taking has occurred ''necessarily requires a weighing of 
private and public interests"); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 163 (1980) ("No police power justification is of-
fered for the deprivation."). 
20 The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on 
the simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so 
as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the state has not "taken" 
anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity. Cf. 
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L. J . 149, 
155-161 (1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1235-1237 (1967). 
However, as the current CHIEF JUSTICE has explained: "The nuisance 
exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power 
itself." Penn Central Transport Co., 438 U. S., at 145 (REHNQUIST, J ., 
dissenting). This is certainly the case in light of our recent decisions hold-
ing that the "scope of the 'public use' requirement of the Takings Clause is 
'coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.' " See 
- -
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state's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restrict-
ing the uses individuals can make of their property. While 
each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in 
turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on 
others.21 See Penn Central Transponation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 u. s. 104, 144-150 (1978), (REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing); cf. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works , 199 U. S. 306, 322 
(1906). The burdens we suffer are "properly treated as part 
of the burden of common citizenship." Kimball Laundry 
Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 5 (1949). Long ago it was 
recognized that "all property in this country is held under the 
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be in-
jurious to the community," Mugler v. Kansas , 123 U. S. , at 
665; see also Beer Co. v. Massachusetts , 97 U. S. 25, 32 
(1877), and the Takings Clause did not transform that princi-
ple to one that requires compensation whenever the state as-
serts its power to enforce it.2Z See Mugler, 123 U. S., at 
664. 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1014 (1984) (quoting Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984)). See generally Ep-
stein, Takings 108-112 (1985). 
21 The Takings Clause has never been read to require the states or the 
courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens under 
this generic rule in excess of the benefits received. Not every individual 
gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no one 
suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference 
between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits received. 
zr Courts have consistently held that a state need not provide compensa-
tion when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping ille-
gal activity or abating a public nuisance. See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 
394 Mass. 767, 477 N. E. 2d 987 (1985) (hazardous waste operation); Kuban 
v. McGimsey, 96 Nev. 105, 605 P. 2d 623 (1980) (brothel); MacLeod v. Ta-
koma Park, 257 Md. 477, 263 A. 2d 581 (1970) (unsafe building) Eno v. City 
of Burlington, 125 Vt. 8, 209 A. 2d 499 (1965) (fire and health hazard); 
Pompano Horse Club v. State , 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927) (gambling 
facility); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N. E. 31 (1916) ("bawdyhouse"). 
It is hard to imagine a different rule that would be consistent with the 
maxim "Sic utere tau ut alienum no laedas." [Use your own property in 
such manner as not to injure that of another.] See generally Em'f)ire State 
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In Agins v. Tiburon, we explained that the "determination 
that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, 
a determination that the public at large, rather than a single 
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in 
the public interest," and we recognized that this question 
"necessarily requires a weighing of private and public inter-
ests." 447 U. S., at 260-261. As the cases discussed above 
demonstrate, the public interest in preventing activities simi-
lar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in many in-
stances has not required compensation. The Subsidence 
Act, unlike the Kohler Act, plainly seeks to further such an 
interest. Nonetheless, we need not rest our decision on this 
factor alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a 
showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test 
set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our other regulatory 
takings cases. 
Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations 
The second factor that distinguishes this case from Penn-
sylvania Coal is the finding in that case that the Kohler Act 
made mining of "certain coal" commercially impracticable. 
In this case, by contrast, petitioners have not shown any 
deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden 
placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking. For this rea-
son, their takings claim must fail. 
In addressing petitioners' claim we must not disregard the 
posture in which this case comes before us. The District 
Court granted summary judgment to respondents only on the 
facial challenge to the Subsidence Act. The court explained 
that "[b ]ecause plaintiffs have not alleged any injury due to 
the enforcement of the statute, there is as yet no concrete 
controversy regarding the application of the specific provi-
Insurance Company v. Chafetz, 278 F. 2d 41 (CA5 1960). As Professor 
Epstein has recently commented: ''the issue of compensation cannot arise 
until the question of justification has been disposed of. In the typical nui-
sance prevention case, this question is resolved against the claimant." 
Epstein, supra, at 199. 
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sions and regulations. Thus, the only question before this 
court is whether the mere enactment of the statutes and regu-
lations constitutes a taking." 581 F . Supp., at 513 (empha-
sis added). The next phase of the case was to be petitioners' 
presentation of evidence about the actual effects the Subsi-
dence Act had and would have on them. Instead of proceed-
ing in this manner, however, the parties filed a joint motion 
asking the court to certify the facial challenge for appeal. 
The parties explained that an assessment of the actual impact 
that the Act has on petitioners' operations "will involve com-
plex and voluminous proofs," which neither party was cur-
rently in a position to present, App. 15-17, and stressed that 
if an appellate court were to reverse the District Court on the 
facial challenge, then all of their expenditures in adjudicating 
the as-applied challenge would be wasted. Based on these 
considerations, the District Court certified three questions 
relating to the facial challenge. 23 
The posture of the case is critical because we have recog-
nized an important distinction between a claim that the mere 
enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that 
the particular impact of government action on a specific piece 
of property requires the payment of just compensation. 
This point is illustrated by our decision in Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc. , 452 U. S. 264 
(1981), in which we rejected a pre-enforcement challenge to 
the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977. We concluded that the District Court 
had been mistaken in its reliance on Pennsylvania Coal as 
28 The certified questions asked whether sections 4, 5, or 6 of the Subsi-
dence Act, and various regulations 
"l. Violate the Rule of the Mahon Decision 
"2. Constitute Per Se Takings 
"3. Violate Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of the United States." 
The Court of Appeals recognized the limited nature of its inquiry, point-
ing out that it was passing only on the facial challenge, and that the "as-
applied challenges remains for disposition in the district court. " 771 F. 2d, 
at 710, n. 3. 
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support for a holding that two statutory provisions were un-
constitutional because they deprived coal mine operators of 
the use of their land. The Court explained: 
''the court below ignored this Court's oft-repeated ad-
monition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not 
be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes 
such a decision necessary. See Soci,alist Labor Pany v. 
Gilligan, 408 U. S. 583, 588 (1972); Rescue Army v. 
Munici,pal Court,, 331 U. S. 549, 568-575, 584 (1947); Al-
abama State Federation of Labor v. AcAdory, 325 U. S. 
450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particularly 
important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property. Just last Term, we 
reaffirmed that 
''this court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and 
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, 
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated 
on a few persons. ' Rather, it has examined the 
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries that have identified several fac-
tors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, 
its interference with reasonable investment backed 
expectations, and the character of the government 
action-that have particular significance." Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States , 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979) 
(citations omitted). 
"These 'ad hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted with 
respect to specific property, and the particular estimates 
of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the 
unique circumstances. 
"Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context 
of a facial challenge, it presented no concrete contro-
versy concerning either application of the Act to particu-
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lar surface mining operations or its effect on specific par-
cels of land. Thus, the only issue properly before the 
District Court and, in turn, this Court, is whether the 
'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a 
taking. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 
(1980). The test to be applied in considering this facial 
challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute regulat-
ing the uses that can be made of property effects a taking 
if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land 
.... ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260; see also Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 
(1978)." 452 U. S., at 294-296. 
Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack 
on the Act as a taking. 
The hill is made especially steep because petitioners have 
not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commercially 
impracticable for them to continue mining of their bituminous 
coal interests in western Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners 
have not even pointed to a single mine that can no longer be 
mined for profit. The only evidence available on the effect 
that the Subsidence Act has had on petitioners' mining opera-
tions comes from petitioners' answers to respondents' in-
terrogatories. Petitioners described the effect that the Sub-
sidence Act had from 1966-1982 on 13 mines that the various 
companies operate, and claimed that that they have been re-
quired to leave a bit less than 27 million tons of coal in place 
to support § 4 areas. The total coal in those 13 mines 
amounts to over 1.46 billion tons. See App. 284. Thus § 4 
requires them to leave less than 2% of their coal in place. 24 
But, as we have indicated, nowhere near all of the under-
24 The percentage of the total that must be left in place under § 4 is not 
the same for every mine because of the wide variation in the extent of sur-
face development in different areas. For 7 of the 13 mines identified in the 
record, 1 % or less of the coal must remain in place; for three others, less 
than 3% must be left in place; for the other three, the percentages are 4%, 
7.8%, and 9.4%. See App. 284. 
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ground coal is extractable even aside from the Subsidence 
Act. The categories of coal that must be left for § 4 purposes 
and other purposes are not necessarily distinct sets, and 
there is no information in the record as to how much coal is 
actually left in the ground solely because of § 4. We do 
lmow, however, that petitioners have never claimed that 
their mining operations, or even any specific mines, have 
been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor 
is there evidence that mining in any specific location affected 
by the 50% rule has been unprofitable. 
Instead, petitioners have sought to narrowly define certain 
segments of their property and assert that, when so defined, 
the Subsidence Act denies them economically viable use. 
They advance two alternative ways of carving their property 
in order to reach this conclusion. First, they focus on the 
specific tons of coal that they must leave in the ground under 
the Subsidence Act, and argue that the Commonwealth has 
e:ff ectively appropriated this coal since it has no other useful 
purpose if not mined. Second, they contend that the Com-
monwealth has taken their separate legal interest in prop-
erty-the "support estate." 
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to com-
pare the value that has been taken from the property with 
the value that remains in the property, one of the critical 
questions is determining how to define the unit of property 
''whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction." 
Michelman, Property, Utlity, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967). 25 In Penn Central the 
Court explained: 
"'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
211 See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J . 36, 60 
(1964); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 566-567 (1984). 
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tirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular gov-
ernmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on 
the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as 
a whole-here the city tax block designated as the 'land-
mark site."' 438 U. S., at 131. 
Similarly, in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979), we held 
that ''where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property 
rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a 
taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 
Id., at 65-66. Although these verbal formulization do not 
solve all of the definitional issues that may arise in defining 
the relevant mass of property, they do provide sufficient 
guidance to compel us to reject petitioners' arguments. 
1. The Coal in Place 
- The parties have stipulated that enforcement of the DE R's 
50% rule will require petitioners to-leave approximately 27 
million tons of coal in place. Because they own that coal but 
cannot mine it, they contend that Pennsylvania has appropri-
ated it for the public purposes described in the Subsidence 
Act. 
This argument fails for the reason explained in Penn Cen-
tral and Andrus. The 27 million tons of coal do not consti-
tute a separate segment of property for takings law pur-
poses. Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property 
owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his 
property. A requirement that a building occupy no more 
than a specified percentage of the lot on which it is located 
could be characterized as a taking of the vacant area as 
readily as the requirement that coal pillars be left in place~ 
Similarly, under petitioners' theory one could always argue 
that a set-back ordinance requiring that no structure be built 
within a certain distance from the property line constitutes a 
taking because the footage represents a distinct segment of 
property for takings law purposes. Cf. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 
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U. S. 603 (1927) (upholding validity of set-back ordinance) 
(per Holmes, J.). There is no basis for treating the less than 
2% of petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of property. 
We do not consider Justice Holmes' statement that the 
Kohler Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially im-
practicable as requiring us to focus on the individual pillars of 
coal that must be left in place. That statement is best under-
stood as referring to the Pennsylvania Coal Company's asser-
tion that it could not undertake profitable anthracite coal 
mining in light of the Kohler Act. There were strong asser-
tions in the record to support that conclusion: For example, 
the coal company claimed that one company was ''unable to 
operate six large collieries in the City of Scranton, employing 
more than five thousand men." Motion to Advance for Ar-
gument 2. 28 As Judge Adams explained: 
"At first blush, this language seems to suggest that the 
Court would have found a taking no matter how little of 
the defendants' coal was rendered unmineable-that be-
cause 'certain' coal was no longer accessible, there had 
been a taking of that coal. However, when one reads 
the sentence in context, it becomes clear that the Court's 
concern was with whether the defendants' 'right to mine 
coal . .. [could] be exercised wi,th 'fJTOfit.' 260 U. S. at 
414 (emphasis added). . . . Thus, the Court's holding in 
Mahon must be assumed to have been based on its un-
derstanding that the Kohler Act rendered the business 
of mining coal unprofitable." 771 F. 2d, at 716, n. 6. 
When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is 
viewed in the context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' 
coal mining operations and financial-backed expectations, it is 
plain that the petitioners have not come close to satisfying 
21 Of course, the company also argued that the Subsidence Act made it 
commercially impracticable to mine the very coal that had to be left in 
place. Although they could have constructed pillars for support in place of 
the coal, the cost of the artificial pillars would have far exceeded the value 
of the coal. See Pennsylvania Coal, Petitioners' Brief at 7-9. 
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their burden of proving that they have been denied the eco-
nomically viable use of that property. The record indicates 
that only about 75% of petitioners' underground coal can be 
profitably mined in any event, and there is no showing that 
petitioners' reasonable ''investment-backed expectations" 
have been materially affected by the additional duty to retain 
the small percentage that must be used to support the struc-
tures protected by § 4. 27 
a. The Suwort Estate 
A Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique in regard-
ing the support estate as a separate interest in land that can 
be conveyed apart from either the mineral estate or the sur-
face estate. 28 Petitioners therefore argue that even if com-
parable legislation in another state would not constitute a 
taking, the Subsidence Act has that consequence because it 
entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate. 
It is clear, however, that our takings jurisprudence fore-
closes reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle 
of property rights. For example, in Penn Central, the 
Court rejected the argument that the "air rights" above the 
terminal constituted a separate segment of property for 
Takings Clause purposes. 438 U. S., at 130. Likewise, in 
Andrus v. Allard, we viewed the right to sell property as 
just one element of the owner's property interest. 444 
U. S. , at 65-66. In neither case did the result turn on 
ZT We do not suggest that the state may physically appropriate relatively 
small amounts of private property for its own use without paying just com-
pensation. The question here is whether there has been any talcing at all 
when no coal has been physically appropriated, and the regulatory pro-
gram places a burden on the use of only a small fraction of the property 
that is subjected to regulation. See generally n. 18, supra. 
21 See Charnetski v. Miner's Mills Coal Mining Co. , 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 
683 (1921); Penman v. Jones , 256 Pa. 416 (1917); Captline v. County of Al-
legheny, 74 Pa. Cmmwlth. 85, 459 A. 2d 1298 (1983), cert. denied, 466 
U. S. 904 (1984); see generally Montgomery, The Development of the 
Right of Subjacent Support and the 'Third Estate' in Pennsylvania, 25 
Temple L. Q. 1 (1951). 
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whether state law allowed the separate sale of the segment of 
property. 
The Court of Appeals, which is more familiar with Pennsyl-
vania law than we are, concluded that as a practical matter 
the support estate is always owned by either the owner of the 
surface or the owner of the minerals. It stated: 
"The support estate consists of the right to remove the 
strata of coal and earth that undergird the surface or to 
leave those layers intact to support the surface and pre-
vent subsidence. These two uses cannot co-exist and, 
depending upon the purposes of the owner of the support 
estate, one use or the other must be chosen. If the 
owner is a mine operator, the support estate is used to 
exploit the mineral estate. When the right of support is 
held by the surface owner, its use is to support that sur-
face and prevent subsidence. Thus, although Pennsyl-
vania law does recognize the support estate as a 'sepa-
rate' property interest, id., it cannot be used profitably 
by one who does not also possess either the mineral es-
tate or the surface estate. See Montgomery, The Devel-
opment of the Ri,ght of Subjacent Suwort and the 'Third 
Estate in Pennsylvania,' 25 Temple L. Q. 1, 21 (1951)." 
771 F. 2d, at 715-716. 
Thus, in practical terms, the support estate has value only 
insofar as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with 
which it is associated. Its value is merely a part of the en-
tire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal 
or the surface. Because petitioners retain the right to mine 
virtually all of the coal in their mineral estates, the burden 
the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a tak-
ing. Petitioners may continue to mine coal profitably even if 
they may not destroy or damage surface structures at will in 
the process. 
But even if we were to accept petitioners' invitation to 
view the support estate as a distinct segment of property for 
''takings" purposes, they have not satisfied their heavy bur-
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den of sustaining a facial challenge to the Act. Petitioners 
have acquired or retained the support estate for a great deal 
of land, only part of which is protected under the Subsidence 
Act, which, of course, deals with subsidence in the immediate 
vicinity of certain structures, bodies of water, and cemeter-
ies. See n. 6, supra. The record is devoid of any evidence 
on what percentage of the purchased support estates, either 
in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, has 
been affected by the Act. Under these circumstances, peti-
tioners' facial attack under the takings clause must surely 
fail. 29 
IV 
In addition the their challenge under the Takings Clause, 
petitioners assert that § 6 of the Subsidence Act violates the 
Contracts Clause by not allowing them to hold the surface 
owners to their contractual waiver of liability for surface 
damage. Here too, we agree with the Court of Appeals and 
the District Court that the Commonwealth's strong public in-
terests in the legislation are more than adequate to justify 
the impact of the statute on petitioners' contractual 
agreements. 
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
was Article I, § 10 that provided the primary constitutional 
check on state legislative power. The first sentence of that 
section provides: 
"No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; 
coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 
29 Another unanswered question about the level of diminution involves 
the District Court's observation that the support estate carries with it far 
more than the right to cause subsidence damage without liability. See 581 
F . Supp. , at 519. There is no record as to what value these other rights 
have and it is thus impossible to say whether the regulation of subsidence 
damage under certain structures, and the imposition of liability for damage 
to certain structures, denies petitioners the economically viable use of the 
support estate, even if viewed as a distinct segment of property. 
• - -
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gold or silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of No-
bility." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10. 
Unlike other provisions in the section, it is well-settled 
that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of con-
tracts is not to be read literally. W. B. Worthen Co. v. 
Thomas , 292 U. S. 426, 433 (1934). The context in which the 
contract clause is found , the historical setting in which it was 
adopted, 30 and our cases construing the clause, indicate that 
its -primary focus was upon legislation that was designed to 
repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships 
that obligors were unable to satisfy. See e.g., W. B . Worthen 
Co., supra; Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 
U. S. 398 (1934). Even in such cases, the Court has refused 
to give the clause a literal reading. Thus, in the landmark 
case of Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 
398 (1934), the Court upheld Minnesota's statutory morato-
rium against home foreclosures, in part, because the legisla-
tion was addressed to the "legitimate end" of protecting "a 
basic interest of society," and not just for the advantage of 
some favored group. Id. , at 445. 
As Justice Stewart explained: 
"[I]t is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Con-
tract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police 
power of the States. 'It is the settled law of this court 
that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation 
of contracts does not prev·ent the State from exercising 
30 "It was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social 
evil-the state legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of 
their obligations under certain contracts-and thus was intended to pro-
hibit States from adopting 'as [their] policy the repudiation of debts or the 
destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them, ' Home 
Buildi11g & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 439 (1934)." Allied 
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such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the 
common weal, or are necessary for the general good of 
the public, though contracts previously entered into be-
tween individuals may thereby be affected. This 
power, which in its various ramifications is known as the 
police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort 
and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to 
any rights under contracts between individuals. ' 
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 480. As Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes succinctly put the matter in his opinion for 
the Court in Hudson Water Co. v. McCaner, 209 U. S. 
349, 357: 'One whose rights, such as they are, are subject 
to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power 
of the State by making a contract about them. The con-
tract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject mat-
ter.'" Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 
U. s. 234, 241-242 (1978). 
In assessing the validity of the petitioners' Contract Clause 
claim in this case, we begin by identifying the precise con-
tractual right that has been impaired and the nature of the 
statutory impairment. Petitioners claim that they obtained 
damage waivers for a large percentage of the land surface 
protected by the Subsidence Act, but that the Act removes 
the surface owners' contractual obligations to waive dam-
ages. We agree that the statute operates as "a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship," id. , at 244, and 
therefore proceed to the asserted justifications for the 
impairment. 31 
31 As we have mentioned above, we do not -Jmow what percentage of peti-
tioners' acquired support estate is in fact restricted under the Subsidence 
Act. See su:pra, at 28-29, and n. 29. Moreover, we have no basis on 
which to conclude just how substantial a part of the support estate the 
waiver of liability is. These inquiries are both essential to determine the 
"severity of the impairment," which in turn affects "the level of scrutiny to 
which the legislation will be affected." Energy Reserve Group v. Kansas 
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The record indicates that since 1966 petitioners have con-
ducted mining operations under approximately 14,000 struc-
tures protected by the Subsidence Act. It is not clear 
whether that number includes the cemeteries and water 
courses under which mining has been conducted. In any 
event, it is petitioners' position that, because they contracted 
with some previous owners of property generations ago, 32 
they have a constitutionally protected legal right to conduct 
their mining operations in a way that would make a shambles 
of all those buildings and cemeteries. As we have discussed, 
the Commonwealth has a strong public interest in preventing 
this type of harm, the environmental effect of which tran-
scends any private agreement between contracting parties. 
Of course, the finding of a significant and legitimate public 
purpose is not, by itself, enough to justify the impairment of 
contractual obligations. A court must also satisfy itself that 
the legislature's "adjustment of 'the rights and responsibil-
ities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable condi-
Power & Li,ght Co. , 459 U. S. 400, 411 (1983). While these dearths in the 
record might be critical in some cases, they are not essential to our discus-
sion here because the Subsidence Act withstands scrutiny even if it is as-
swned that it constitutes a totai impairment. 
31 Most of these waivers were obtained over 70 years ago as part of the 
support estate which was itself obtained or retained as an incident to the 
acquisition or retention of the right to mine large quantities of under-
ground coal. No question of enforcement of such a waiver against the 
original covenantor is presented; rather, petitioners claim a right to en-
force the waivers against subsequent owners of the surface. This claim is 
apparently supported by Pennsylvania precedent holding that these waiv-
ers run with the land. See Kormuth v. United States Steel Co., 379 Pa. 
365, 108 A. 2d 907 (1954); Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15, 22 (1880). That 
the Pennsylvania courts might have had, or may in the future have, a valid 
basis for refusing to enforce these perpetual covenants against subsequent 
owners of the surface rights is not necessarily a sufficient reason for con-
cluding that the legislative impairment of the contracts is permissible. 
See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 (1924); Central Land Com-
pany v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895) (distinguishing legislative and judi-
cial action). 
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tions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying [the legislation's] adoption. " ' Energy Reserve 
Group v. Kansas Power & Li.ght Co. , 459 U. S. 400, 412 
(1983) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 
U. S. 1, 22 (1977)). But, we have repeatedly held that un-
less the state is itself a contracting party, courts should, 
" 'properly def er to legislative judgment as to the necessity 
and reasonableness of a particular measure."' Energy Re-
serve Group, 459 U. S., at 412-413 (quoting United States 
Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22-23)). 
As we explained more fully above, the Subsidence Act 
plainly survives scrutiny under our standards for evaluating 
impairments of private contracts. 33 The Commonwealth has 
determined that in order to deter mining practices that could 
have severe effects on the surface, it is not enough to set out 
guidelines and impose restrictions, but that imposition of li-
ability is necessary. By requiring the coal companies either 
to repair the damage or to give the surface owner funds to 
repair the damage, the Commonwealth accomplishes both de-
terrence and restoration of the environment to its previous 
condition. We refuse to second guess the Commonwealth's 
determinations that these are the most appropriate ways of 
dealing with the problem. We conclude, therefore, that the 
impairment of petitioners' right to enforce the damage waiv-
ers is amply justified by the public purposes served by the 
Subsidence Act. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
31 Because petitioners did not raise the issue before the District Court, 
the Court of Appeals rejected their attempt to argue on appeal that the 
Subsidence Act also affects contracts to which the state is a party. See 
771 F. 2d, at 718, n. 8. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1092 
KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NICHOLAS DEBENE-
DICTIS, SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL RESOURCES, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1987] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
More than 50 years ago, this Court determined the con-
stitutionality of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act as it affected the 
property interests of coal mine operators. Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922). The Bituminous 
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act approved today 
effects an interference with such interests in a strikingly sim-
ilar manner. The Court finds at least two reasons why this 
case is different. First, we are told, "the character of the 
governmental action involved here leans heavily against find-
ing a taking." Ante, at 13. Second, the Court concludes 
that the Subsidence Act neither "makes it impossible for peti-
tioners to profitably engage in their business," nor involves 
"undue interference with [petitioners'] investment-backed . 
expectations." Ibid. Neither of these conclusions per-
suades me that this case is different, and I believe that the 
Subsidence Act works a taking of petitioners' property inter-
ests. I therefore dissent. 
I 
In apparent recognition of the obstacles presented by 
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tempts to undermine the authority of Justice Holmes' opinion 
as to the validity of the Kohler Act, labeling it "uncharac-
teristically ... advisory." Ante, at 11. I would not so 
readily dismiss the precedential value of this opinion. There 
is, to be sure, some language in the case suggesting that it 
could have been decided simply by addressing the particular 
application of the Kohler Act at issue in the case. See e. g. 
Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 414 ("If we were called upon to 
deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it 
clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest suffi-
cient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's 
constitutionally protected rights"). The Court, however, 
found that the validity of the Act itself was properly drawn 
into question: "[T]he case has been treated as one in which 
the general validity of the [Kohler] act should be discussed. " 
260 U. S., at 414. 1 The coal company clearly had an interest 
in obtaining a determination that the Kohler Act was unen-
forceable if it worked a taking without providing for com-
pensation. For these reasons, I would not find that the opin-
ion of the Court in Pennsylvania Coal advisory in any 
respect. 
The Court's implication to the contrary is particularly dis-
turbing in this context, because the holding in Pennsylvania 
Coal today discounted by the Court has for 55 years been 
the foundation of our "regulatory takings" jurisprudence. 
See Penn Central Transportation Co . v. New York City , 438 
U. S. 104, 127 (1978); D. Hagman & J. Juergensmeyer, 
Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 319 
(2d ed. 1986) ("Pennsylvania Coal was a monumental deci-
1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the decision under review, had 
also determined that the case called for "consideration . . . of the constitu-
tionality of the act itself. " Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co ., 274 Pa. 489, 
494 (1922). Before this Court, the coal company persisted in its claim that 
the Pennsylvania statute took its property without just compensation. 
See Brief of Plaintiffs in Error in Pennsylvania Coal, supra, 7-8, 16, 
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sion which remains a vital element in contemporary taking 
law.") We have, for example, frequently relied on the ad-
monition that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., at 415. See 
e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles, -- U. S. --, -- (1987); MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. --, --
(1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1003 
(1984); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 
83 (1980); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962); 
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 
168 (1958). Thus, even were I willing to assume that the 
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal standing alone is reasonably 
subject to an interpretation that renders more than half the 
discussion "advisory," I would have no doubt that our re-
peated reliance on that opinion establishes it a cornerstone of 
the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensa-
tion Clause. 
I accordingly approach this case with greater deference to 
the language as well as the holding of Pennsylvania Coal 
than does the Court. Admittedly, questions arising under 
the Just Compensation Clause rest on ad hoc factual inqui-
ries, and must be decided on the facts and circumstances in 
each case. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, supra, at 124; United States v. Central Eureka 
Mining Co., supra, at 168. Examination of the relevant fac-
tors presented here convinces me that the differences be-
tween them and those in Pennsylvania Coal verge on the 
trivial. 
II 
The Court first determines that this case is different from 
Pennsylvania Coal because "the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant 
threat to the common welfare." Ante, at 13. In my view, 
reliance on this factor represents both a misreading of Penn-
sylvania Coal and a misunderstanding of our precedents. 
" - -
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A 
The Court opines that the decision in Pennsylvania Coal 
rested on the fact that the Kohler Act was "enacted solely for 
the benefit of private parties," ante, at 14 and "served only 
private interests." Ante, at 12. A review of the Kohler Act 
shows that these statements are incorrect. The Pennsylva-
nia legislature passed the statute "as remedial legislation, de-
signed to cure existing evils and abuses." 274 Pa., at 495 
(quoting the Act). These were public "evils and abuses," 
identified in the preamble as "wrecked and dangerous streets 
and highways, collapsed public buildings, churches, schools, 
factories, stores and private dwellings, broken gas, water 
and sewer systems, the loss of human life . . . . " Id., at 
496. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that 
these concerns were "such as to create an emergency, prop-
erly warranting the exercise of the police power . . . . " 27 4 
Pa., at 497. There can be no doubt that the Kohler Act was 
intended to serve public interests. 
Though several aspects of the Kohler Act limited its pro-
tection of these interests, see Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., 
at 414, this Court did not ignore the public interests served 
by the Act. When considering the protection of the "single 
private house" owned by the Mahons, the Court noted that 
"[n]o doubt there is a public interest even in this." 27 4 
U. S., at 413 (emphasis added). It recognized that the Act 
"affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places 
where the right to mine such coal has been reserved." 
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., at 414. See also, id., at 416 
("We assume . . . that the statute was passed upon the con-
2 That these were public "evils and abuses" is further illustrated by the 
coverage of the Act, which regulated mining under "any public building or 
any structure customarily used by the public" including churches, schools, 
hospitals, theaters, hotels, and railroad stations. Protected areas also in-
cluded streets, roads, bridges or "any other public passageway, dedicated 
to public use or habitually usod by the public," as well as public utility 
structures, private homes, workplaces, and cemeteries. 
- -
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viction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and 
we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the 
exercise of eminent domain"). The strong public interest in 
the stability of streets and cities, however, was insufficient 
"to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. , at 416. 
Thus, the Court.made clear that the mere existence of a pub-
lic purpose was insufficient to release the government from 
the compensation requirement: "The protection of private 
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is 
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken 
for such use without compensation." Id., at 415. 
The Subsidence Act rests on similar public purposes. 
These purposes were clearly stated by the legislature: "[T]o 
aid in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance 
the value of [surface area] lands for taxation, to aid in the 
preservation of surface water drainage and public water sup-
plies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such 
lands . . .. " Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 52, § 1406.2. The Act's 
declaration of policy states that mine subsidence "has seri-
ously impeded land development . . . has caused a very clear 
and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the 
people of Pennsylvania [and] erodes the tax base of the af-
fected municipalities." Pa. Stat. Ann. , Title 52, § 1406.3. 
The legislature determined that the prevention of subsidence 
would protect surface structures, advance the economic fu-
ture and well-being of Pennsylvania, and ensure the safety 
and welfare of the Commonwealth's residents. Ibid. Thus, 
it is clear that the Court has severely understated the simi-
larity of purpose between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler 
Act. The public purposes in this case are not sufficient to 
distinguish it from Pennsylvania Coal. 3 
3 The _Court notes that the particulars of the Subsidence Act better 
serve these public purposes than did the Kohler Act. Ante, at 14. This 
may well be true, but our inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as 
a license to judge the effectiveness of legislation. When considering the 
- -
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B 
The similarity of the public purpose of the present Act to 
that in Pennsylvania Coal does not resolve the question of 
whether a taking has occurred; the existence of such a public 
purpose is merely a necessary prerequisite to the govern-
ment's exercise of its taking power. See Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 239-243, 245 (1984); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The nature 
of these purposes may be relevant, for we have recognized 
that a taking does not occur where the government exercises 
its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from 
using his property to injure others without having to compen-
sate the value of the forbidden use. See Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian 239 
U. S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887). 
See generally Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, supra, 144-146 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J. , dissenting). 
The Court today indicates that this "nuisance exception" 
alone might support its conclusion that no taking has oc-
curred. Despite the Court's implication to the contrary, see 
ante, at 13-14 and n. 15, the legitimacy of this purpose is a 
question of federal , rather than state, law, subject to inde-
pendent scrutiny by this Court. This statute is not the type 
of regulation that our precedents have held to be within the 
"nuisance exception" to takings analysis. 
Fifth Amendment issues presented by Hawaii's Land Reform Act, we 
noted that the Act, "like any other, may not be successful in achieving its 
intended goals. But 'whether in fact the provisions will accomplish the 
objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied 
if . .. the .. . [state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the 
[Act] would promote its objective." Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 242 (1984), quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. 
Co. v. State Ed. of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 671-672 (1981). Con-
versely, our cases have never found it sufficient that legislation efficiently 
achieves its desired objectives to hold that the compensation required by 
the Fifth Amendment is unavailable. 
- -
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The ease with which the Court moves from the recognition 
of public interests to the assertion that the activity here reg-
ulated is "akin to a public nuisance" suggests an exception far 
wider than recognized in our previous cases. "The nuisance 
exception to the taking guarantee," however, "is not cotermi-
nous with the police power itself," Penn Central Transporta-
tion, supra, at 145 (REHNQUIST, J . , dissenting), but is a nar-
row exception allowing the government to prevent "a misuse 
or illegal use." Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 86 (1911). 
It is not intended to allow "the prevention of a legal and es-
sential use, an attribute of ownership." Ibid. 
The narrow nature of this exception is compelled by the 
concerns underlying the Fifth Amendment. Though, as the 
Court recognizes, ante, at 18-19, the Fifth Amendment does 
not prevent actions that secure a "reciprocity of advantage," 
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S. , at 415, it is designed to pre-
vent "the public from loading upon one individual more than 
his just share of the burdens of government, and says that 
when he surrenders to the public something more and differ-
ent from that which is exacted from other members of the 
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him." 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States , 148 U. S. 
312, 325 (1893). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, supra, at 123-25; Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). A broad exception to the op-
eration of the Just Compensation Clause based on the exer-
cise of multifaceted health, welfare and safety regulations 
would surely allow government much greater authority than 
we have recognized to impose societal burdens on individual 
landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is 
intended to secure for the public an extra measure of "health, 
safety and welfare." 
Thus, our cases applying the "nuisance" rationale have in-
volved at least two narrowing principles. First, nuisance 
regulations exempted from the Fifth Amendment have 
rested on discrete and narrow purposes. See Goldblatt v. 
- -
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Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1961); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U. S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 673 (1887). 
The Subsidence Act, however, is much more than a nuisance 
statute. The central purposes of the Act, though including 
public safety, reflect a concern for preservation of buildings, 
economic development, and maintenance of property values 
to sustain the Commonwealth's tax base. We should hesi-
tate to allow a regulation based on essentially economic con-
cerns to be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth Amend-
ment by labeling it nuisance regulation. 
Second, and more significantly, our cases have never ap-
plied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of 
the value of a parcel of property. Though nuisance regula-
tions have been sustained despite a substantial reduction in 
value, we have not accepted the proposition that the state 
may completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all 
use without providing compensation. Thus, in Mugler v. 
Kansas, supra, the prohibition on manufacture and sale of in-
toxicating liquors made the distiller's brewery "of little 
value" but did not completely extinguish the value of the 
building. Similarly, in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 
(1928), the individual forced to cut down his cedar trees nev-
ertheless was able "to use the felled trees." Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City , 438 U. S., at 126. 
The restriction on surface mining upheld in Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, supra, may have prohibited "a beneficial use" of 
the property, but did not reduce the value of the lot in ques-
tion. 396 U. S. , at 593, 594. In none of these cases did the 
regulation "destroy essential uses of private property." 
Curtin v. Benson, supra, at 86. 
Here, petitioners' interests in particular coal deposits have 
been completely destroyed. By requiring that defined 
seams of coal remain in the ground, see ante, at 4-5 and n. 7, 
§ 4 of the Subsidence Act has extinguished any interest one 
might want to acquire in this property, for" 'the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it."' Pennsylvania Coal, 
- -
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supra, at 414, quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal 
Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331, 100 A. 820, 820 (1917). Application of 
the nuisance exception in these circumstances would allow 
the state not merely to forbid one "particular use" of prop-
erty with many uses but to extinguish any beneficial use of 
petitioners' property. 4 
Though suggesting that the purposes alone are sufficient to 
uphold the Act, the Court avoids reliance on the nuisance ex-
ception by finding that the Subsidence Act does n9t impair 
petitioners' investment backed expectations or ability to 
profitably operate their businesses. This conclusion follows 
mainly from the Court's broad definition of the "relevant 
mass of property'' ante, at 25, which allows it to ascribe to 
the Subsidence Act a less pernicious effect on the interests of 
the property-owner. The need to consider the effect of regu-
lation on some identifiable segment of property makes all im-
portant the admittedly difficult task of defining the relevant 
parcel. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U. S. , at 149, n. 13 (REHNQUIST, J ., dissenting). 
For the reasons explained below, I do not believe that the 
Court's opinion adequately performs this task. 
III 
The Pennsylvania Coal Court found it sufficient that the 
Kohler Act rendered it "commercially impracticable to mine 
certain coal." 260 U. S. , at 414. The Court, ante, at 26, ob-
serves that this language is best understood as a conclusion 
that certain coal mines could not be operated at a profit. Pe-
titioners have not at this stage of the litigation rested their 
• Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531 (1914), is not to 
the contrary. Though the Court in that case upheld a statute requiring 
mine operators to leave certain amounts of coal in their mines, examination 
of the opinion in Plymouth Coal reveals that the statute was not chal-
lenged as a taking for which compensation was due. Instead, the coal 
company complained that the statutory provisions for defining the width of 
required pillars of coal were constitutionally deficient as a matter of proce-
dural due process. 
- -
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claim on similar proof; they have not "claimed that their min-
ing operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprof-
itable since the Subsidence Act was passed." Ante, at 24. 
The parties have, however, stipulated for purposes of this fa-
cial challenge that the Subsidence Act requires petitioners to 
leave in the ground 27 million tons of coal, without compensa-
tion therefor. Petitioners also claim that the Act extin-
guishes their purchased interests in support estates which 
allow them to mine the coal without liability for subsidence. 
We are thus asked to consider whether these restrictions are 
such as to constitute a taking. 
A 
The Court's conclusion that the restriction on particular 
coal does not work a taking is primarily the result of its view 
that the 27 million tons of coal in the ground "do not consti-
tute a separate segment of property for takings law pur-
poses." Id. , at 25. This conclusion cannot be based on the 
view that the interests are too insignificant to warrant pro-
tection by the Fifth Amendment, for it is beyond cavil that 
government appropriation of "relatively small amounts of pri-
vate property for its own use" requires just compensation. 
Ante, at 27, n. 27. Instead, the Court's refusal to recognize 
the coal in the ground as a separate segment of property for 
takings purposes is based on the fact that the alleged taking 
is "regulatory," rather than a physical intrusion. See ante, 
at 16, n. 18. On the facts of this case, I cannot see how the 
label placed on the government's action is relevant to consid-
eration of its impact on property rights. 
Our decisions establish that governmental action short of 
physical invasion may constitute a taking because such regu-
latory actions might result in "as complete. [a loss] as if the 
[government] had entered upon the surface of the land and 
taken exclusive possession of it." United States v. Causby, 
328 U. S. 256, 261 (1946). Though the government's direct 
benefit may vary depending upon the nature of its action, the 
- -
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question is evaluated from the perspective of the property 
holder's loss rather than the government's gain. See Ibid.; 
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 
(1945); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 
189, 195 (1910). Our observation that "[a] 'taking' may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government," Penn 
Central Transportation.Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 
124, was not intended to alter this perspective merely be-
cause the claimed taking is by regulation. Instead, we have 
recognized that regulations-unlike physical invasions-do 
not typically extinguish the "full bundle" of rights in a par-
ticular piece of property. In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 
51, 56 (1979), for example, we found it crucial that a prohi-
bition on the sale of avian artifacts destroyed only "one 
'strand' of the bundle" of property rights, "because the ag-
gregate must be viewed in its entirety." This characteristic 
of regulations frequently makes unclear the breadth of their 
impact on identifiable segments of property, and has required 
that we evaluate the effects in light of the "several factors" 
enumerated in Penn Central Transportation Co.: "[t]he eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant, ... the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with investment-
backed expectations, [and] the character of the governmental 
action." 438 U. S., at 124. 
No one, however, would find any need to employ these an-
alytical tools where the government has physically taken an 
identifiable segment of property. Physical appropriation by 
the government leaves no doubt that it has in fact deprived 
the owner of all uses of the land. Similarly, there is no need 
for further analysis where the government by regulation ex-
tinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable seg-
ment of property, for the effect of this action on the holder of 
the property is indistinguishable from the effect of a physical 
- -
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taking. 5 Thus, it is clear our decision in Andrus v. Allard, 
supra, would have been different if the government had con-
fiscated the avian artifacts. In my view, a different result 
would also follow if the government simply prohibited every 
use of that property, for the owner would still have been "de-
prive[d] of all or most of his interest in the subject matter." 
United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 U. S. 373, 378 
(1945). 
In this case, enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its 
regulations will require petitioners to leave approximately 27 
million tons of coal in place. There is no question that this 
coal is an identifiable and separable property interest. Un-
like many property interests, the "bundle" of rights in this 
coal is sparse. " 'For practical purposes, the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it."' Pennsylvania Coal , 260 
U. S., at 414, quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 
256 Pa. , at 331. From the relevant perspective-that of the 
property owners-this interest has been destroyed every bit 
as much as if the government had proceeded to mine the coal 
for its own use. The regulation, then, does not merely in-
hibit one strand in the bundle, cf. Andrus v. Allard, supra, 
but instead destroys completely any interest in a segment of 
property. In these circumstances, I think it unnecessary to 
"There is admittedly some language in Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City , 438 U. S. 104, 130-131 (1978), that suggests a con-
trary analysis: "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather on 
both the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with 
rights in the parcel as a whole." The Court gave no guidance on how one is 
to distinguish a "discrete segment" from a "single parcel. " It was not 
clear, moreover, that the air rights at issue in Penn Central were entirely 
eliminated by the operation of New York City's Landmark Preservation 
Law, for, as the Court noted, ''it simply cannot be maintained, on this 
record, that appellants have been prohibited from occupying any portion 0f 
the airspace above the Terminal." Id., at 136. 
- -
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consider whether petitioners may operate individual mines or 
their overall mining operations profitably, for they have been 
denied all use of 27 million tons of coal. I would hold that § 4 
of the Subsidence Act works a taking of these property 
interests. 
B 
Petitioners also claim that the Subsidence Act effects a 
taking of their support estate. Under Pennsylvania law, the 
support estate, the surface estate, and the mineral estate are 
"three distinct estates in land which can be held in fee simple 
separate and distinct from each other .. .. " Captline v. 
County of Allegheny, 74 Pa. Cmmwlth. 85, - , 459 A. 2d 
1298, 1301(1983), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 904 (1984). In re-
fusing to consider the effect of the Subsidence Act on this 
property interest alone, the Court dismisses this feature of 
Pennsylvania property law as simply a "legalistic distinctio[n] 
within a bundle of property rights." Ante, at 27. "Its 
value," the Court informs us, "is merely a part of the entire 
bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or 
the surface." Ante, at 28. See also 771 F. 2d, at 716 ("To 
focus on the support estate separately . . . would serve little 
purpose.") This view of the support estate allows the Court 
to conclude that its destruction is merely the destruction of 
one "strand" in petitioner's bundle of property rights, not sig-
nificant enough in the overall bundle to work a taking. 
Contrary to the Court's approach today, we have evaluated 
takings claims by reference to the units of property defined 
by state law. In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, for example, we 
determined that certain "health, safety, and environmental 
data" was "cognizable as a trade-secret property right under 
Missouri law," 467 U. S., at 1003, and proceeded to evaluate 
the effects of governmental action on this state-defined prop-
erty right. 6 Reliance on state law is necessitated by the fact 
8 Indeed, we rejected the claim that the Supremacy Clause allowed Con-
gress to dictate that the effect of its regulation "not vary depending on the 
property Jaw of the State in which the submitter [of trade secret informa-
- -
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that "[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law." Webb's Fabu lou.,s 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 (1980), 
quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). 
In reality, the Court's decision today cannot reject this neces-
sary reliance on state law. Rather, it simply rejects the sup-
port estate as the relevant segment of property and evalu-
ates the impact of the Subsidence Act by reference to some 
broader, yet undefined, segment of property presumably rec-
ognized by state law. 
I see no reason for refusing to evaluate the impact of the 
Subsidence Act on the support estate alone, for Pennsylvania 
has clearly defined it as a separate estate in property. The 
Court suggests that the practical significance of this estate is 
limited, because its value "is merely part of the bundle of 
rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the sur-
face." Ante, at 28. Though this may accurately describe 
the usual state of affairs, I do not understand the Court to 
mean that one holding the support estate alone would find it 
worthless, for surely the owners of the mineral or surface es-
tates would be willing buyers of this interest. 7 Nor does the 
Court suggest that the owner of both the mineral and support 
estates finds his separate interest in support to be without 
value. In these circumstances, where the estate defined by 
state law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is 
appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that par-
ticular property interest. 
tion] is located. . . . If Congress can 'pre-empt' state property law in the 
manner advocated . .. , then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality." 
Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto , 467 U.S 986, 1012 (1984). 
' It is clear that under Pennsylvania law, "one person may own the coal, 
another the surface, and the third the rig11t of support." Smith v. Glen 
Alden Coal Co. , 347 Pa. 290, -, 32 A. 2d 227, 234-235 (1943). 
- -
85-1092-DISSENT 
KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSN. v. DEBENEDICTIS 15 
When held by owners of the mineral estate, the support es-
tate "consists of the right to remove the strata of coal and 
earth that undergird the surface .. . " 771 F. 2d, at 715. 
Purchase of this right, therefore, shifts the risk of subsidence 
to the surface owner. Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, by 
making the coal mine operator strictly liable for any damage 
to surface structures caused by subsidence, purports to place 
this risk on the holder of the mineral estate regardless of 
whether the holder also owns the support estate. Operation 
of this provision extinguishes the petitioners' interests in 
their support estates, making worthless what they purchased 
as a separate right under Pennsylvania law. Like the re-
striction on mining particular coal, this complete interference 
with a property right extinguishes its value, and must be ac-
companied by just compensation. 8 
IV 
In sum, I would hold that Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine 
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act effects a taking of pe-
titioners' property without providing just compensation. 
Specifically, the Act works to extinguish petitioners' interest 
in at least 27 million tons of coal by requiring that coal to be 
left in the ground, and destroys their purchased support es-
tates by returning to them financial liability for subsidence. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to the 
contrary. 9 
8 It is therefore irrelevant that petitioners have not presented evidence 
of "what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggre-
gate or with respect to any individual estate, has been affected by the 
Act." Ante , at 29. There is no doubt that the Act extinguishes support 
estates. Because it fails to provide compensation for this taking, the Act 
violates the dictates of the Fifth Amendment. 
9 Because I would find § 6 of the Subsidence Act unconstitutional under 
the Fifth Amendment, I would not reach the Contracts Clause issue ad-
dressed by the Court, ante, at 29-33. 
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